Between Armed Conflicts and El Niño: The Dangerous Convergence of Crises in the Red Sea
Currently, two unrelated crises are unfolding simultaneously in the Red Sea region: the conflict disrupting shipping in the region’s two main strategic straits, the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and a severe El Niño event confirmed by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in June 2026.
Each of these crises, taken individually, would place considerable pressure on one of the world’s most food-insecure regions (the Red Sea region includes particularly fragile countries such as Somalia, Yemen, and Sudan). Their combination further exacerbates the risks.
Abdek Mahamoud Abdi, University of Montpellier
THE ESSENTIALS
- The war is disrupting trade routes in the Red Sea, driving up the cost of grain, fuel, and fertilizer imports and threatening regional supplies.
- El Niño is exacerbating the climate crisis, with drought and extreme heat followed by potential flooding, which is taking a toll on crops and livestock.
- The combination of the two crises could amplify their respective effects, at a time when Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen have very little room to absorb another shock.
The Crisis of Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea
The region has already faced the potential impact that a crisis in the Red Sea could have on regional food security.
Following the Houthi rebels’ attacks on commercial ships in November 2023, average daily traffic through the Suez Canal (Egypt) fell by about 57% in just a few months, dropping from 4 million to 1.7 million metric tons per day. Nearly 15% of global maritime trade passes through the Red Sea, including about 8% of the grain trade. Ships that continued their voyages mainly sailed around the Cape of Good Hope (South Africa), thereby extending their journey by ten to fourteen days and incurring an estimated additional fuel cost of about one million dollars per voyage.
This situation has led to rising prices for wheat, fuel, and fertilizer throughout East Africa. In Yemen, this has resulted in worsening hunger, as the country imports about 90 percent of its staple grains. In December 2023, due to a lack of funding, the World Food Program suspended general food distribution in areas under the control of the Sanaa authorities, after negotiations to reduce the number of beneficiaries from 9.5 million to 6.5 million failed. https://www.youtube.com/embed/7Aon2xInKwk?wmode=transparent&start=0
Furthermore, in March 2024, a Houthi missile destroyed the cargo ship Rubymar, which was carrying 21,000 metric tons of fertilizer, endangering the region’s coral reefs and desalination plants. This incident served as a reminder of the risks associated with the convergence of maritime transport, agricultural inputs, and armed conflict along the same shipping route.
Since the military escalation involving Iran, Israel, and the United States in February 2026, the Iranian Navy has repeatedly closed the Strait of Hormuz, leading to a decline in oil traffic, which has fallen well below pre-war levels. On July 20, the Houthis imposed a new blockade against Saudi Arabia, and two days later, they claimed responsibility for attacks on two other oil tankers in the Red Sea.
These transit points, which are essential for the transport of energy and fertilizer, are under increasing pressure, and marine insurers are already beginning to charge for this risk, which drives up transportation costs and may, ultimately, be passed on to consumer prices.
The latest episode of the El Niño phenomenon
In addition, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) has confirmed the development of a new El Niño event since June 2026 and forecasts that it will intensify significantly throughout the fall. https://www.youtube.com/embed/i066Lb24e1Q?wmode=transparent&start=0
In the Horn of Africa and the southern Arabian Peninsula, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda, and Yemen are expected to face a severe rainfall deficit and extreme heat from June through September 2026. Regional forecasters at the IGAD Center for Climate Prediction and Applications (ICPAC) are already comparing this abnormal drought to those of 1997 and 2023—two years that were particularly devastating for local harvests and the food security of populations already weakened by conflict, political instability, forced displacement, and successive climate shocks.
Seasonal forecasts indicate an increased risk of above-normal rainfall between October and December in several regions of East Africa, raising concerns about episodes of heavy rain and flooding. What might initially seem like a relief is more likely to serve as a reminder, in some areas, of the extreme rainfall and flooding observed during the powerful El Niño event of 1997–1998. That event was marked by devastating floods in East Africa and deadly flash floods in Yemen’s wadis.
Faced with this succession of two climatic extremes (drought followed by floods), farmers, herders, and coastal communities in the region are deprived of a period of stability needed to rebuild and restore their livelihoods, which keeps them in a state of chronic vulnerability.
The convergence of these two crises in the Red Sea
Taken separately, the war and El Niño would already pose significant challenges for the region. When combined, these two phenomena do more than simply add up; each amplifies the effects of the other.
A rise in import prices caused by the war has a greater impact on communities whose crops or livestock have recently been affected by drought. Furthermore, a region where a large part of the humanitarian response depends on a single maritime corridor has limited room to maneuver if that corridor is disrupted at a time when needs are skyrocketing due to climate-related factors.
The first victims of the impact are already on the verge of exhaustion.
In Sudan, according to the latest joint data from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Program (WFP), as of June 2026, approximately 19.5 million people—or 41 percent of the population—are suffering from acute hunger; famine has been confirmed in the Zamzam camp as well as in El Fasher and Kadugli, and 14 other areas are considered at risk through September.
In Somalia, approximately 6 million people are facing high levels of acute food insecurity this year, including nearly 1.9 million at the “emergency” level, with a risk of famine reported in the Burhakaba district.
In Yemen, approximately 18.3 million people are facing acute food insecurity, and as of July 21, 2026, only 19% of the UN’s humanitarian appeal for the country had been funded. None of these countries has the necessary flexibility to absorb an additional shock to its imports, on top of those already underway.
Djibouti plays a central role in this dynamic. More than 90 percent of Ethiopia’s trade, including grains and pesticides, passes through Djibouti’s ports. The World Food Program also operates its regional humanitarian logistics hub there, which includes grain silos with a capacity of 40,000 metric tons (out of a total storage capacity of 65,000 metric tons), serving as a supply and transshipment point for Somalia, Yemen, Sudan, South Sudan, and Ethiopia.
Ethiopian agriculture, already weakened by years of internal conflict and erratic rainfall, cannot afford another round of delays or high logistics costs (as in 2024). If traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (south of the Red Sea) were to deteriorate as it did in 2024—or even worse— it would not only pose a challenge for Djibouti’s port infrastructure but would also directly disrupt the supply corridor serving a country with a population of over 136 million and providing a significant portion of the region’s humanitarian aid.
Five Concrete Steps
The 2023–2024 crisis served as a prelude and, above all, a lesson that has been largely overlooked. Five concrete measures could help build greater resilience in the face of these unprecedented shocks and improve the situation this time around.
First, food and fertilizer shipments should be treated differently from ordinary cargo, by giving them priority for naval escorts and insurance support, so that they are not considered ordinary goods subject to the same commercial risk assessments. In addition, international donors (the World Bank and other development organizations) could co-finance a government-backed reinsurance mechanism to cover the additional costs.
Second, launching indirect diplomatic negotiations (through regional mediators) with the Houthis would help protect and secure the routes of humanitarian ships or those deemed vulnerable, following the model of the 2022 Black Sea Grain Initiative.
Third, it is crucial to mobilize humanitarian funding before crop failures occur, not after. Proactive response mechanisms—such as funding transfers, support for livestock culling, and the prepositioning of supplies as soon as a weather threshold is crossed—have already proven effective in the Horn of Africa. With an El Niño event forecast several months in advance, the window of opportunity to respond in this way is now open.
Fourth, it would be advisable to build on the climate emergency infrastructure already in place in Djibouti and optimize it to ensure better performance during this crisis. The WFP’s humanitarian logistics base in Djibouti was designed specifically to withstand this type of regional and climate-related shock.
Fifth, it would be desirable for Ethiopia and Djibouti to continue their efforts to optimize and connect the various existing port terminals, not only as a long-term development project but also as a concrete measure to protect against the risk of a single crossing point becoming immobilized. Above all, cross-border harmonization of customs barriers along the corridors can help reduce the final cost of commodities.
Abdek Mahamoud Abdi, EDBA doctoral student, University of Montpellier
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Readthe original article.