The “anti-elitist” elite: a French paradox
The results of the presidential election have led many observers to believe that France would be divided into three camps: a governing center, a right wing comprising both conservative and extremist factions, and a left wing largely aligned with its radical wing.
William Genieys, Sciences Po and Mohammad-Saïd Darviche, University of Montpellier
Factors in electoral sociology—such as voter abstention, generational divides, and lifestyle differences —explain why this is not simply a repeat of the 2017 scenario. Indeed, the “Yellow Vests” crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic have intensified the sense of “loathing” toward politicians representing the ruling parties. Emmanuel Macron embodies this aversion particularly well.
Toward a Convergence in Rhetoric Against the “Elites”?
Few of these analysts, however, have highlighted the unprecedented success of candidates who present themselves as anti-elitist.
The term “elite” comes from the verb *eligere* (“to choose”), a Latin term in use in France as early as the12th century. In contemporary times, “elite” and “elitism” refer to a certain number of “chosen” individuals within society who are destined to lead those not “chosen,” linking this concept to the notion of merit. In contrast to aristocracy, elitism has a positive social and political connotation. Anti-elitism is a radical critique of this concept. Applied to political life today, it involves questioning the “meritocratic” nature of competence—and thus the legitimacy—of the elites in representative democracy.
This is how we describe the candidates who employed anti-elitist rhetoric during the campaign. The far right— Éric Zemmour, Marine Le Pen—the sovereigntist right— Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, Jean Lassalle, as well as candidates from the radical left—such as Jean-Luc Mélenchon, Philippe Poutou, and Nathalie Artaud —have denounced the power of the “oligarchy,” the “powerful,” “finance,” the “elite,” “those at the top,” and so on.
Candidates who employed this rhetoric in the first round of the presidential elections between 2012 and 2022 received a steadily increasing share of the vote: 33% in 2012; 49.8% in 2017; and 61.1% in 2022. While it is not really possible to establish a causal link between this rhetoric and these results, we can assume that this rhetoric did not offend voters enough to dissuade them from voting for these candidates.
Rhetoric Against Representative Democracy
This anti-elitist rhetoric —which populist leaders have been promoting for more than a decade—transcends the left-right divide.
As Jacques Julliard points out, the social movement of 1995 was the historic moment that made anti-elitist rhetoric “one of the standard tropes of political discourse.” Since then, it has steadily become central not only to the most radical forms of right-wing discourse but also, increasingly, to those on the left, particularly La France insoumise. Gérald Bronner points out that even more moderate professional politicians do not shy away from using this form of “cognitive demagoguery.” Everyone will recall the slogan “My opponent is the world of finance!” coined by François Hollande during the 2012 election campaign. In this context, rational arguments lose their legitimacy, since even those who are supposed to champion them discard them in the name of electoral gain.
From this perspective, the oligarchy of “the rich, the political caste,” and the technocrats of the “deep state (whether French or in Brussels)” must go. This call to get rid of the elite is inherent in the division of the world between the (good) people and the (evil) elite. Shouldn’t good naturally drive out evil? Although this reduction of political struggle to religious categories is typically part of the far-right’s conceptual framework, it has also been theorized by the so-called “radical” left.
The philosopher Chantal Mouffe thus calls for the rejection of reason—the foundation of liberal democracy—in favor of“libidinal energy.” She proposes to “mobilize” this “malleable” energy against the oligarchy in order to “build” the “people.” From this perspective, emotions and affects must translate into a “physical and visceral” rejection of the elite, as suggested by Representative François Ruffin.
Furthermore, anti-elitism is presented as a political discourse that can “save” democracy. For its proponents, contemporary elitism runs counter to the egalitarian ideal and overshadows major projects of emancipation in favor of neoliberal globalization.
The Mobilization of the Decline of "Grand Narratives"
This anti-elitism draws its strength from the decline of “grand narratives” (liberalism, socialism, etc.) and is now readily co-opted by critics of representative democracy. This ideological fuel for leaderless social movements, such as the “Yellow Vests,” makes it possible to mobilize an ever-wider electorate around a purported divide between the “elite bloc” and the “popular bloc.”
The reasoning of these critics of the “oligarchy” is based on a “terrible oversimplification”: the myth of the existence of a “Conscious, Coherent, and Conspiratorial” elite (the “3 C ”model ), which James Meisel has criticized for distorting the theory of the ruling class by Gaetano Mosca. Indeed, this oversimplification makes it easy to associate any form of elite mediation with conspiracy theories.
In populist discourse, the idea of a unified elite maximizing its own interests strongly competes with the idea—which is more consistent with democratic pluralism—of a multiplicity of elite groups competing for political, religious, social, and economic power.
In the United States, since the administration of George W. Bush, studies have discussed the role of a“shadow elite ” that allegedly promoted the Second Gulf War. However, the argument that neoconservative networks and the foreign policy establishment were intertwined is based on research whose scientific rigor is questionable. More empirically sound research has shown that, in the case of health insurance reform, interest groups (Big Pharma, insurance companies, etc.) did not play such a role in the Obama administration. Yet, despite the lack of evidence, the myth of an omnipotent elite influencing all democratic decisions persists. Against a backdrop of a crisis of confidence in those in power, this reinforces the belief in anti-elitism.
The Elite of Anti-Elitism: Another Oligarchy?
Taking this sociological line of reasoning further, one could argue that certain leaders who employ anti-elitist rhetoric also constitute an elite. British diplomat and former Conservative minister Georges Walden has described the emergence of an “upper-caste elite of anti-elitists” composed of individuals from highly privileged social backgrounds, such as Prime Ministers David Cameron and Boris Johnson. Both are products of the elite Eton-Oxford educational track.
In France, the anti-elite elite is characterized by its profile as professional political career. Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon are emblematic examples of this, as evidenced by their careers and their leadership within their respective parties. The former is a “political heiress” who entered politics at the age of 18, rose through the ranks of the National Front, and has been running for president since 2012. The latter is a “product of the French-style meritocracy,” having earned his CAPES in modern literature while simultaneously joining the Socialist Party in 1976.
Throughout his long political career, he has held various elected offices, including those of member of the National Assembly, senator, and member of the European Parliament, as well as the executive position of Minister Delegate for Vocational Education (2000–2002). Since founding his own party (Le Parti de Gauche in 2008, which became La France Insoumise in 2016), he, too, has run for president three times. Furthermore, both have established undisputed leadership within their political parties, as evidenced by their continuous reelection to leadership positions. This iron-fisted control over the organization illustrates the “iron law of oligarchy” so dear to Roberto Michels.
The criteria used in the sociology of elites—namely, social background, education, career path, length of political career, holding multiple offices, and the type of offices held—show, unsurprisingly, how little distinguishes them from those they criticize.
William Genieys, CNRS Research Director at the CEE, Sciences Po and Mohammad-Saïd Darviche, Associate Professor, University of Montpellier
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