Defining “radicalism” to better combat it
The concept of “political radicalism” is multifaceted and open to multiple interpretations. In public debate, the term “radical” is generally applied to movements or ideas to highlight their deviation from the accepted norm, often with the intention of marginalizing them within the political system.
Nicolas Lebourg, University of Montpellier
This is how the terms come into use radicalization, radical, radicalism, ultra, extreme sometimes used indiscriminately in the media or by politicians.
However, the legal rules governing partisan organizations can serve as a basis for establishing a practical and objective definition of the concept of political radicalism. We therefore propose, to better understand what we mean when we use this term, to draw on French law as a guiding framework, on the understanding that it can be extrapolated to other political and legal contexts and thus to other cultural spheres—while keeping in mind that the very meaning of words extremism and extremes vary greatly depending on the context.
French executive
Under French law, political parties are nonprofit associations governed by the law of July 1, 1901, and their constitutional role is recognized under theFifth Republic byArticle 4 of the Constitution.
Several restrictions are thus placed on the very existence of a political party. The 1901 law stipulates that associations may not have “as their purpose the undermining of the integrity of the national territory or the republican form of government.” The judiciary has the authority to dissolve any association that fails to comply with these criteria. The Constitution specifies that
“Political parties and groups contribute to the exercise of the right to vote. They are formed and operate freely. They must respect the principles of national sovereignty and democracy.”
Nevertheless, political parties—like de jure and de facto associations that do not engage in electoral activities—are still subject to the law of January 10, 1936 (now Article L.212-1 of the Internal Security Code).
The legislative text of January 10, 1936, specified that:
“All associations or de facto groups shall be dissolved by decree issued by the President of the Republic in the Council of Ministers if they: (1) Incite armed demonstrations in the streets; (2) Or which, apart from military training organizations approved by the Government and physical education and sports organizations, have, by virtue of their military form and organization, the character of combat groups or private militias; (3) Or which have as their purpose to undermine the integrity of the national territory or to attack, by force, the republican form of government.”
Known for having been enacted against far-right leagues, this law was therefore not intended to regulate the electoral process but rather the entire spectrum of political activism.
The ordinance of December 30, 1944, amended the law of January 10, 1936, by allowing for action against groups that hindered the process of restoring democracy after the war; subsequently, the supplementary law of January 5, 1951, went further by adding to the list of groups that could be targeted those
“whose purpose would be either to bring together individuals who have been convicted of collaborating with the enemy or to glorify such collaboration.”
Laws enacted in the aftermath of World War II
These laws were enacted in a democratic context that had been traumatized and weakened by World War II. The development of international institutions aimed at protecting and maintaining peace reinforced these types of measures.
Thus, the law of July 1, 1972—known as the “Pleven Law”—which extended the 1965 United Nations International Convention, brought associations that
“would incite discrimination, hatred, or violence against a person or group of persons on the basis of their origin or their membership in—or lack thereof—a particular ethnic group, nation, race, or religion, or would propagate ideas or theories intended to justify or encourage such discrimination, hatred, or violence.”
The law of January 10, 1936, would eventually undergo a series of amendments beginning in the late 1980s. In particular, the law of September 9, 1986—enacted in the wake of a series of terrorist attacks that struck the country—added groups that “engage, on French territory or from that territory, in activities aimed at provoking acts of terrorism in France or abroad.”
The provisions of the law of January 10, 1936, were finally incorporated into the Internal Security Code (L. 212-1) in 2012. Under the state of emergency, the law of November 21, 2015, expanded this framework to include the authority to dissolve:
“by decree of the Council of Ministers, associations or de facto groups that participate in acts that seriously undermine public order, or whose activities facilitate or incite such acts.”
As early as the spring of 2016, the provision was applied to the association that managed the “radical” mosque in Lagny-sur-Marne (Seine-et-Marne).
Based on the current state of the law, it is therefore possible to identify several characteristics of “political radicalism”: undermining the republican form of government, undermining the integrity of the territory, the existence of ties to the Vichy regime or to any effort to rehabilitate it, and incitement to hatred, discrimination, or violence.
Ideological radicalism is very often accompanied by the use of militant violence, in forms that are also listed by law: armed demonstrations, paramilitary practices, terrorism, and serious breaches of public order.
The “republican form of government,” as defined in French law, must therefore be understood as a representative and pluralistic democratic system of institutions.
What the situation across the Rhine tells us
These elements thus provide some foundations for understanding what “radicalism” is and, potentially, extending the concept to the international level.
German law offers further perspectives here—noting that the concept of extremism in Germany refers to the intent to attack the representative democratic system.
In this context, “radicalism” corresponds to critiques of liberalism that are rooted within the democratic sphere.
German political parties are enshrined in the Basic Law, Germany’s Constitution, since May 8, 1949 (Article 21), and in the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe, which ensures compliance with fundamental rights. The Court has been called upon to clarify the role of political parties in Germany, both with regard to their constitutionality and their funding mechanisms.
Jake Mohan/Wikipedia, CC BY-SA
From a legal standpoint, German political parties are associations of a special category whose purpose is to “protect the liberal and democratic basic order.”
In addition to this article, political parties are subject to the law of July 24, 1967. The 1967 law addresses the Court’s concerns and ensures that political parties comply with Article 21, particularly paragraph 2: “Parties which, based on their objectives or the conduct of their members, seek to undermine the free and democratic basic order, to overthrow it, or to jeopardize the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany are unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional Court rules on the question of unconstitutionality.” It is up to the Court to clarify, in accordance with its case law, what is meant by “free and democratic basic order.” In 2017, for example, it rejected the request to dissolve the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) on the grounds that the party’s capacity for action was insufficient to undermine the constitutional order.
The Right to Democratic Expression
These debates are also taking place at the European level;
Thus, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which is primarily based onArticle 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, has also provided a framework for balancing pluralistic expression with the preservation of democratic values and institutions.
The general principle is the right to democratic expression; that is, while political groups must be able to propose constitutional amendments, such demands cannot be advanced through violence and cannot target fundamental democratic principles.
Vladimir Morozov/akxmedia/Flickr, CC BY-SA
This definition differs significantly from that in French law, since, for example, the dissolution of movements seeking to undermine the current territorial integrity of a country is considered by the Court to be a violation of Article 11, unless the claim is expressed through violent means.
These legal provisions apply to established movements—Article 11 addresses the issue of freedom of association, and the ECHR has decided to include political organizations within this framework.
The ECHR also recognizes the right of States to combat violent demonstrations or those inciting hatred instigated by “civil society organizations” that do not fall under the category of political parties.
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The Rise of Rigid Thinking
Indeed, the concept of radicalism cannot be limited to legally recognized political groups, because “radicalism” is linked to the processes of “radicalization.”
We will therefore define radicalization as the gradual and evolving adoption of a rigid way of thinking—an absolute and non-negotiable truth—whose logic shapes the worldview of its adherents, who resort to violent means to make their views heard, most often within clandestine, whether formalized or virtual, which isolate them from ordinary social references and project a grandiose image of themselves back to them.
Three elements thus underpin the approach to radicalization: its evolving nature, the adoption of sectarian thinking, and the potential use of armed violence.
Radicals therefore generally aim to change liberal institutions and the egalitarian humanist values upon which they are built, or even to bring about a social restructuring of varying scope in order to eliminate an “enemy”—ideologically and symbolically constructed as a major figure in a world often imagined as Manichean.
This text was co-authored by Cécile Alduy, Professor at Stanford University and Research Associate at Cevipof, Sciences Po; Jean-Yves Camus, Director of the Observatory on Political Radicalism at the Jean Jaurès Foundation and Research Associate at IRIS; Sylvain Crépon, University of Tours, Laboratory for the Study and Research Public Action (LERAP); Xavier Crettiez, university professor and agrégé in political science, Center for Sociological Research on Law and Penal Institutions (Cesdip), Sciences Po Saint-Germain-en-Laye; Romain Ducoulombier, historian; Delphine Espagno, assistant professor, Sciences Po Toulouse, Laboratory for the Social Sciences of Politics (LaSSP); Stéphane François, Research Associate at the Societies, Religions, and Secularism Group (GSRL); Joël Gombin, Research Associate at the Belief, History, Space, and Political and Administrative Regulation Group (CHERPA), Sciences Po Aix; Guillaume Origoni, Ph.D. candidate in contemporary history at the University of Paris Nanterre within the Center for Multidisciplinary and Multilingual Research (CRPM); Dominique Sistach, assistant professor, University of Perpignan Via Domitia, CDED/CERTAP.
Nicolas Lebourg, Research Associate at CEPEL (Center for Political Studies of Latin Europe), University of Montpellier
The original version This article was published on The Conversation.