Defining “radicalism” to better combat it
The concept of “political radicalism” is multifaceted and open to multiple interpretations. In public discourse, the term “radical” is generally applied to movements or ideas to highlight their deviation from accepted norms, often with the intention of marginalizing them within the political system.
Nicolas Lebourg, University of Montpellier
This is how we see the terms appear radicalization, radical, radicalism, ultra, extreme sometimes used indiscriminately in the media or by politicians.
However, the legal rules governing partisan organizations can serve as a basis for establishing a practical and objective definition of the concept of political radicalism. We therefore propose, to better understand what we mean when we use this term, to draw on French law as a guiding framework, with the understanding that this can be extrapolated to other political-legal contexts and thus other cultural spheres—while keeping in mind that the very meaning of words extremism and extremism vary greatly depending on the context.
French executive
Under French law, political parties are nonprofit associations governed by the Law of July 1, 1901, and their constitutional role is recognized under theFifth Republic byArticle 4 of the Constitution.
Several restrictions are thus placed on the very existence of a party. The 1901 law stipulates that associations may not have “the aim of undermining the integrity of the national territory or the republican form of government.” The judiciary is empowered to dissolve any association that fails to meet these criteria. The Constitution specifies that
“Political parties and groups contribute to the exercise of the right to vote. They are formed and operate freely. They must respect the principles of national sovereignty and democracy.”
Nevertheless, political parties—like de jure and de facto associations that do not engage in electoral activities—remain subject to the law of January 10, 1936 (now Article L.212-1 of the Internal Security Code).
The legislative text of January 10, 1936, specified that:
“All associations or de facto groups shall be dissolved by decree issued by the President of the Republic in the Council of Ministers if: (1) They incite armed demonstrations in the streets; (2) Or which, apart from military training societies approved by the Government and physical education and sports societies, would, by their military form and organization, resemble combat groups or private militias; (3) Or which would have as their aim to undermine the integrity of the national territory or to attack by force the republican form of government.”
Known for having been enacted against far-right leagues, this law was therefore not intended to regulate the electoral process but rather the entire sphere of political activism.
The ordinance of December 30, 1944, amended the law of January 10, 1936, by allowing for the prosecution of groups hindering the postwar restoration of democracy; subsequently, the supplementary law of January 5, 1951, went further by adding to the list of groups subject to prosecution those
“whose purpose would be either to bring together individuals who have been convicted of collaborating with the enemy, or to glorify such collaboration.”
Laws enacted in the aftermath of World War II
These laws were enacted against the backdrop of a democratic system that had been traumatized and weakened by World War II. The development of international institutions aimed at protecting and maintaining peace reinforced such measures.
Thus, the law of July 1, 1972, known as the “Pleven Law,” extending the 1965 United Nations International Convention, brought associations that
“would incite discrimination, hatred, or violence against a person or group of persons on the basis of their origin or their membership or non-membership in a particular ethnic group, nation, race, or religion, or would propagate ideas or theories intended to justify or encourage such discrimination, hatred, or violence.”
The law of January 10, 1936, would eventually undergo a series of amendments beginning in the late 1980s. In particular, the law of September 9, 1986, following a series of attacks on the country, added groups that “engage, on French territory or from that territory, in activities aimed at provoking acts of terrorism in France or abroad.”
The provisions of the law of January 10, 1936, were finally incorporated into the Internal Security Code (L. 212-1) in 2012. Under the state of emergency, the law of November 21, 2015, added to this framework the possibility of dissolving:
“by decree of the Council of Ministers, associations or de facto groups that participate in acts constituting a serious breach of public order, or whose activities facilitate or incite such acts.”
As early as spring 2016, the provision was applied to the association that managed the “radical” mosque in Lagny-sur-Marne (Seine-et-Marne).
Based on the current state of the law, it is therefore possible to identify several characteristics of “political radicalism”: undermining the republican form of government, undermining the integrity of the territory, the existence of links to Collaboration or to any attempt to rehabilitate it, and incitement to hatred, discrimination, or violence.
Ideological radicalism is very often accompanied by the use of militant violence, in forms also listed by the law: armed demonstrations, paramilitary practices, terrorism, and serious breaches of public order.
The “republican form of government,” as defined in French law, must therefore be understood as a democratic, representative, and pluralistic system of institutions.
What the situation across the Rhine tells us
These elements thus provide some foundations for understanding what radicalism is and, potentially, extending this understanding to the international level.
German law offers further perspectives here—noting that the concept of extremism in Germany refers to the intent to attack the representative democratic system.
In this context, “radicalism” corresponds to critiques of liberalism that are embedded within the democratic sphere.
German political parties have been enshrined in the Basic Law, Germany’s Constitution, since May 8, 1949 (Article 21), and in the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe, which ensures compliance with fundamental rights. The Court has been called upon to clarify the role of political parties in Germany, both regarding their constitutionality and their funding mechanisms.
Jake Mohan/Wikipedia, CC BY-SA
From a legal standpoint, German political parties are associations of a special category whose purpose is to “protect the liberal and democratic basic order.”
In addition to this article, parties are subject to the law of July 24, 1967. The 1967 law addresses the Court’s concerns and ensures that parties comply with Article 21, particularly paragraph 2: “Parties which, based on their objectives or the conduct of their members, seek to undermine the free and democratic basic order, to overthrow it, or to jeopardize the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany are unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional Court rules on the question of unconstitutionality.” It is up to the Court to clarify, through its case law, what is meant by “free and democratic basic order.” In 2017, it thus rejected the request to dissolve the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) on the grounds that its capacity for action did not allow it to undermine the constitutional order.
The right to democratic expression
These debates are also taking place at the European level;
Thus, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which is primarily based onArticle 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, has also provided a framework for balancing pluralistic expression with the preservation of democratic values and institutions.
The general principle is the right to democratic expression, meaning that while political groups must be able to propose constitutional amendments, such demands cannot be advanced through violence and cannot target fundamental democratic principles.
Vladimir Morozov/akxmedia/Flickr, CC BY-SA
This definition differs significantly from that found in French law, since, for example, the dissolution of movements seeking to undermine the current territorial integrity of a state is considered by the Court to be a violation of Article 11, unless the claim is expressed through violent means.
These legal provisions apply to established movements—Article 11 addresses the issue of freedom of association, with the ECHR having decided to include political organizations within this framework.
The ECHR also recognizes the right of States to combat violent demonstrations or those inciting hatred instigated by “civil society organizations” that do not fall under the category of political parties.
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The Rise of Rigid Thinking
Indeed, the concept of radicalism cannot be limited to legally recognized political groups, as “radicalism” is linked to processes of “radicalization.”
We will therefore define radicalization as the gradual and evolving adoption of rigid thinking—an absolute and non-negotiable truth—whose logic shapes the worldview of the actors, who use violent means of action to make their views heard, most often within clandestine, formalized or virtual, which isolate them from ordinary social references and project a grandiose image of themselves back to them.
Three elements thus underpin the approach to radicalization: its evolving nature, the adoption of sectarian thinking, and the potential use of armed violence.
Radicals therefore generally aim to change liberal institutions and the egalitarian humanist values upon which they are built, or even to bring about a more or less extensive social restructuring to eliminate an “enemy,” constructed ideologically and symbolically as a major figure in a world often imagined as Manichean.
This text was co-authored by Cécile Alduy, Professor at Stanford University and Research Associate at Cevipof, Sciences Po; Jean-Yves Camus, Director of the Observatory of Political Radicalism at the Jean Jaurès Foundation and Research Associate at IRIS; Sylvain Crépon, University of Tours, Laboratory for the Study and Research Public Action (LERAP); Xavier Crettiez, University Professor and agrégé in political science, Center for Sociological Research on Law and Penal Institutions (Cesdip), Sciences Po Saint-Germain-en-Laye; Romain Ducoulombier, historian; Delphine Espagno, Assistant Professor, Sciences Po Toulouse, Laboratory of Social Sciences of Politics (LaSSP); Stéphane François, Research Associate at the Societies, Religions, and Secularism Group (GSRL); Joël Gombin, Research Associate at the Belief, History, Space, Political and Administrative Regulation Group (CHERPA), Sciences Po Aix; Guillaume Origoni, PhD candidate in contemporary history at Paris Nanterre University within the Center for Multidisciplinary and Multilingual Research (CRPM); Dominique Sistach, Assistant Professor, University of Perpignan Via Domitia, CDED/CERTAP.
Nicolas Lebourg, Research Associate at CEPEL (Center for Political Studies of Latin Europe), University of Montpellier
The original version This article was published on The Conversation.