Will “La France Insoumise” be able to sustain itself over the long term?
Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s third-place finish in the first round of the April 2022 presidential election is the culmination of a third successful campaign by the leader of France’s radical left, rather than the result of a long-term trend dating back to the launch of La France Insoumise.
Arthur Groz, University of Montpellier
Understanding the current state of this political structure requires an assessment of both its strengths in reshaping the national political landscape and the limitations it has encountered over the past six years since its founding.
During the 2010s, the electoral successes of Syriza in Greece and later of Podemos in Spain inspired a movement centered around the Left Party and Jean-Luc Mélenchon, which shared the view that attempts to form a “left-wing cartel”—a coalition of parties—had failed.
On Wednesday, February 10, 2016, during a television appearance, Jean-Luc Mélenchon surprised everyone by announcing his candidacy for the 2017 French presidential election. Only a few close associates had been informed of this decision, which marked the end of the Front de Gauche and the launch of a new movement, La France Insoumise.
A structure inspired by prominent figures on the left
The success was immediate, facilitated by a minimalist and free online registration process typical of the new forms of political organizing emerging in Europe: as of March 27, 2017, the campaign website had 332,123 registered users. This structure, openly inspired by Podemos, seeks to reconcile the top-down decision-making and charismatic leadership of a traditional party with the grassroots engagement through local support groups characteristic of the “movement parties” analyzed by Rémi Lefebvre.
The France Insoumise candidate ultimately won 19.58 percent of the vote in the first round of the 2017 presidential election, trailing closely behind the Les Républicains candidate—a breakthrough that was partially confirmed in June by the election of 17 members of parliament. Such early successes could have positioned France Insoumise as the leading opposition force, a role it had set out to assume.
Five years later, the initial optimism had given way to significant disillusionment, though this did not lead to the organization’s collapse. The “Insoumis” partisan label has lost its significance and is now blending into a broader identity that embodies the idea of a coalition of progressive forces under the name “Union Populaire.”
This new label clearly references Salvador Allende’s Chilean Unidad Popular, as well as the legacy of the Common Program or, more recently, the Greek coalition Syriza, which brings together parties and organizations.
But both in its technical aspects (holograms of the candidate, coordinated social media campaigns) and in its policy platforms, the 2022 campaign is largely a repeat of the 2017 campaign.
The slight decline in the turnout of both members and supporters at rallies and marches (in Marseille as well as in Paris) reflects the movement’s difficulty in sustaining itself over the long term. This extremely mixed record can be attributed to both short-term factors and structural weaknesses that have become particularly evident in recent years.
The Effectiveness and Failures of a Populist Strategy
The FI’s strategy, developed in 2017, can be described as “left-wing populist,” in line with the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. For these thinkers, the goal is to break the electoral deadlock in which the radical left finds itself by proposing a clear program.
This platform is structured around cross-cutting themes designed to mobilize support beyond the ranks of the left, with a particular focus on the working classes who are inclined to abstain from voting or to cast a protest vote for the far right.
In the leader’s discourse, the Republic and national symbols take on new meaning and become intertwined with those inherited from protest movements. Both symbolically and in terms of how people engage, the break with traditional left-wing parties is complete: the party’s minimal organizational structure prevents the formation of local fiefdoms, and La France Insoumise conventions merely ratify the general direction set in advance. The network of Party of the Left cadres forms the backbone of La France Insoumise on the ground.
"Standing on one's own two feet" doesn't prevent a crisis
To maintain momentum between two election cycles that lend themselves to politicization, the FI must “stand on its own two feet” by mobilizing both within institutions and in the streets. Such episodes have shaped the radical left in Southern Europe: the Indignados movement in Spain, the 2011 square-occupation movement in Greece, and the protests against the “Labor Law” in France in 2016 have all served as springboards for the emergence of new political forces that carry their demands into parliament.
But far from strengthening these movements, the rise to power of Syriza and Podemos at the municipal level has tended to coincide with a decline in social mobilization.
The same is true of the FI, which went through a major crisis between 2017 and 2019. Some of the original leaders, such as Thomas Guénolé, Charlotte Girard, and Georges Kuzmanovic, left the party at that time, disappointed by the weakness of its internal democratic mechanisms and shifts in its political stance.
With 11.03% in the first round of the 2017 legislative elections, followed by 4.86% in the second round, 6.31% in the 2019 European elections (winning 6 seats), as well as disappointing results for the “citizens’ lists” supported in the 2020 municipal elections, La France Insoumise’s vote share is in sharp decline.
The disconnect between emerging popular aspirations and political proposals geared toward young, urban college graduates was particularly glaring in 2019. Despite a possible convergence in their demands, the Yellow Vests movement thus did not benefit the FI in any way, even though its activists were quick to get involved.
The failure is real: during this five-year term, the FI has been unable to build a popular coalition around itself that would bring together those disillusioned with institutional politics while giving voice to emerging social movements, in accordance with the “tribune” role so dear to political scientist Georges Lavau.
Grassroots activists are struggling to find their place in an organization that, while granting them considerable autonomy, is run in an extremely top-down manner. Efforts to establish a counter-hegemonic discourse—through outlets such as Le Média or by rallying figures like MP François Ruffin—are struggling to bear fruit in the cultural “war of position” inspired by the ideas of Antonio Gramsci. Nevertheless, the party has maintained the lead it established over the rest of the French left during the previous presidential election.
A Shift to the Left in the 2022 Election?
The endless setbacks faced by the Socialists and Greens—whose core supporters have largely been drawn away by Emmanuel Macron’s momentum—echo the persistent weakness of a lackluster far left. A political space therefore remains open for La France Insoumise, which is gradually repositioning itself on the left.
Should we conclude, then, that the party is breaking with populist strategy, seeking instead to move beyond the left-right divide in favor of new social divides? It is more simply a matter of political expediency, given the weakness of the parliamentary left, coupled with the growing appeal of new political actors. Issues such as environmentalism, feminism, anti-racism, and the fight against authoritarianism are championed wholeheartedly by Jean-Luc Mélenchon and his supporters. This comes at the risk of also introducing into the party’s structure a set of divisions specific to these movements, which are particularly pronounced on the left.
However, the media coverage of these issues and the overrepresentation of a young, educated demographic could end up alienating La France Insoumise from a segment of the working class that is receptive to social justice issues but wary of the “left-wing” label.
These “angry but not far-right” voters, who emerged on the political scene during the Yellow Vests movement, represent the visible part of a mosaic of nonvoters and Le Pen supporters whom the FI sought to win over. Breaking with this initial plan—without, however, managing to reach a social-democratic electorate that still holds a terrible view of Jean-Luc Mélenchon—could jeopardize the radical left’s prospects of coming to power in future elections, especially since the Insoumis candidate failed to advance to the second round of the 2022 presidential election. For the La France Insoumise leader, the 2022 election represented a final campaign before stepping down.
Maintaining the party’s momentum after his departure will be a major challenge, as both the FI and the Union Populaire are initiatives heavily centered around him as a figure. However, the emergence of a leader capable of replacing him while maintaining the party’s programmatic coherence could enable this political camp to break through an electoral glass ceiling that is largely due to Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s divisive personality.
Arthur Groz, Research Associate, University of Montpellier
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Readthe original article.