The European Parliament and its funds: the FN’s political stronghold
Since 2015, the National Front has been the subject of a investigation into suspected fictitious jobs regarding parliamentary assistants to FN MEPs. The investigation conducted by theEuropean Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) at the European Union level recently led to a claim for damages 339,946 euros from the European Parliament.
Emmanuelle Reungoat, University of Montpellier
These practices, which are undoubtedly the exception rather than the rule in this chamber, are characteristic of parties that, having few elected officials and/or limited resources, rely in part on funds allocated by the European Parliament to sustain their political activities in their home countries.
But within the FN, these uses of the term “Europe” are part of a long-standing practice that began with the 1984 election. While the European parliamentary arena may also have contributed, on occasion, to bolstering the rise of the Greens, for example, in this specific case, its development indirectly contributed to destabilizing the national political balance in favor of the far right.
“Europe”: A Boon in Many Ways
For the National Front, the multiple functions of the European elections and the parliamentary institution serve to simultaneously strengthen the party’s practical capacity for action, its visibility, and its legitimacy; support its efforts to broaden its electoral base; and consolidate the leader’s position within the party apparatus.
Thus, since its debut on the European stage in 1984, the National Front has turned MEP seats—and, at times, the institution-funded assistant positions that accompany them—into a veritable “rear base” for the national political struggle waged by its leaders.
Over the decades, in the French national context dominated by a first-past-the-post electoral system, the European election—based on proportional representation—has become a remarkable electoral windfall that provides positions for small and medium-sized parties, particularly prior to its 2003 reform.
A Driver of Professionalization for the FN
While so-called “mid-sized” parties—such as the PCF and the Greens—can see their leaders win national office in legislative elections through agreements with the “major” parties, the FN’s political isolation makes this European election a more decisive opportunity for it than for others. FN leaders understood this immediately, and the overrepresentation of MEPs in the leadership team has, since 1984, been one of the distinguishing features of Marine Le Pen’s movement compared to other parties.
The stakes are high: the goal is to enable leaders to become full-time politicians, to live for and through politics. In a closed national electoral system, the European elections thus serve as an important vehicle for the political professionalization of Front National leaders. It is also a matter of strengthening or relieving the party during times of financial difficulty.
The practice of aligning the FN’s lead candidates in European elections with the key members of the political bureau has been in place since the 1980s (see below). It became established in the 1990s as an explicit strategy, occasionally disrupted by gender parity requirements or the desire to sideline leaders who threatened the supremacy of the party’s president, Jean-Marie Le Pen. Thus, the order in which candidates are listed generally includes the FN president, its secretary-general, the general delegate, and the party’s leading figures.
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But that’s not all. Beyond their mandates, the material resources and funding made available to MEPs by the parliamentary institution itself are also significant sources of growth for the Front National.
Some rather unconventional parliamentary assistants
While this practice is not necessarily limited to the National Front or the European institution, the employment of assistants attached to Members of the European Parliament or to a European political group also allows parties to hire “staff members” whose work can, in part, contribute to supporting the organization’s political activities.
While longitudinal data remain incomplete, the most recent legislative terms (2004–2009 and 2009–2014) reveal characteristics among FN assistants that are atypical for the profession. Many of them have run in local or legislative elections, are often members of the party’s Central Committee, and several hold various positions within the party apparatus (departmental secretaries, national delegates, advisors, or even vice presidents).
The appointment of certain party leaders to positions as parliamentary assistants has been a common practice within the FN since the 1990s. During the 2009–2014 legislative term, three FN vice-presidents were among the local assistants on the grounds of the European Parliament (subject to French law) at a time when the party was in a precarious financial situation and notoriously in debt: Jean-François Jalkh, Floriant Philippot, and Louis Aliot (the latter as early as 2004), who was Marine Le Pen’s partner and campaign coordinator.
Over the past thirty years, the development of European elections and the European Parliament has thus enabled the FN’s top leaders to devote themselves to politics, hold office, gain prominence, and—particularly for the party’s new president—establish her international stature.
Europe as a Source of Legitimacy and Control
The European Parliament has provided the party’s president with additional symbolic resources through the development of renewed partnerships with certain parties at the European level since 2015. These partnerships allow Marine Le Pen to highlight her leadership roles within a European political group, “Europe of Nations and Freedom,” which she co-chairs.
In addition to projecting an image that counterbalances the party’s isolation at the national level, the restructuring of the FN’s European networks in recent years has reinforced, at this level, the party’s strategy of gaining respectability—for example, by ostensibly distancing itself from the most radical parties, such as Hungary’s Jobbik.
The European arena also serves as a tool for the party chairwoman to maintain control over the party apparatus. This realignment of European alliances provides Marine Le Pen with an opportunity to sideline her former rival by depriving Bruno Gollnisch of the political resources afforded by his strong integration into European networks. Finally, the European election has long been a tool for the movement’s president to control the organization, as he retains firm control over candidate nominations.
Political professionals just like anyone else
Ultimately, beyond the FN, we see here some of the effects of the opening of a European political arena on national political competition. While this is not always enough to ensure the long-term survival of a new entrant (one might cite the relative failures of the RPF or the MPF), it indirectly contributes to the pluralism of national political systems and serves as a source of conflict in the face of the depoliticization resulting from the convergence of so-called “government” parties.
As for the Front National’s leaders, they turn out to be, just like the other parties of the “system” (with the exception of the far left), professional politicians. Contrary to the rhetoric about the “new FN,” an analysis of the new leadership’s practices illustrates, [through its approach to Europe as in other fields, the strong continuity it shares with the party of previous decades, that of Jean-Marie Le Pen.
Emmanuelle Reungoat, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Montpellier
The original version This article was published on The Conversation.