Procrastination over the aircraft of the future: when European defense comes up against its contradictions
Coopetition, i.e., cooperation on a given project between two players who are otherwise competitors, is a complex process that can run into difficulties at various stages. This is evident when examining the difficult progress of the aircraft of the future project jointly undertaken by Dassault and Airbus Defense and Space.
Chloé Zanardi, TBS Education and Frédéric Le Roy, University of Montpellier
While Dassault continues to enjoy international success with its Rafale fighter jet, the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) project, which is supposed to embody the future of European combat aviation, is stalling. The summer of 2025 marked a new setback for the ambitious future fighter jet program, which brings together Dassault, representing French interests, and Airbus Defense and Space, representing German interests in particular.
Since its inception, the project, which is primarily presented as a "coopetition" between Dassault and Airbus Defense and Space, has struggled to move forward, despite being heralded as the successor to the Rafale. On July 22, Éric Trappier, CEO of Dassault, denounced the project's governance as "without a real leader" and threatened to leave the program. Berlin initially responded by warning against any change in governance in favor of the French manufacturer, before threatening in turn to leave the project and turn to new partners.
The situation is one of stalled cooperation, in a geopolitical context in which Europe is nevertheless seeking to strengthen its strategic autonomy. The central question is this: how can the defense interests of European states, which require ambitious European programs such as SCAF, be reconciled with the interests of national companies?
What is Scaf, and why is it strategic?
Launched in 2017, the SCAF project aims to develop a fighter jet capable of competing with the American F-35 Lightning II. According to France and Germany, who initiated the project, as well as Spain, the F-35 poses a threat to European sovereignty and justifies the launch of a specifically European program.
The SCAF is scheduled to enter service in 2040, with ambitious objectives. It is a system of systems including a stealth aircraft, a "combat cloud," and a fleet of drones, designed to respond to the technological advancement of other powers. The project is currently in phase 1B, a preparatory stage prior to the construction of a flight demonstrator in phase 2. https://www.youtube.com/embed/SN_G4iN1rdo?wmode=transparent&start=0
For Berlin, the aim is to ensure the continuity of its military aerospace industry through close cooperation with France and Spain. "The success of the project is essential to the competitiveness of the German and European military aerospace industry," emphasizes the German Federal Ministry of Defense in the19thGerman Armament Report.
Coopetition and sovereignty: the European dilemma of the SCAF
Coopetition, i.e., cooperation with a competitor, is based on a paradoxical logic. Companies collaborate to create value, but at the same time seek to capture as much of it as possible for themselves. This leads them to share knowledge in order to progress and co-innovate, while protecting their strategic knowledge to avoid unwanted transfers. Coopetition therefore combines equal parts trust and mistrust, inevitably generating tension.
At the European level, coopetition between states and between manufacturers appears to be a strategic lever for strengthening technological sovereignty. But this strategy also carries major risks: transfers of sensitive knowledge, asymmetric capture of value co-created with a partner... who remains, despite everything, a competitor (Le Roy et al., 2022).
These issues take on a particular dimension when they affect sovereignty. Cooperating with a foreign manufacturer, even a European one, can amount to giving them the means to compete with you in the future.
In the SCAF project, this cooperative dilemma is particularly significant. Dassault, on the French side, and Airbus Defense and Space, on the German side, must cooperate to develop the aircraft of the future as part of a European ambition. But Dassault and Airbus Defense and Space are competitors on the global market, with the Rafale for Dassault and the Eurofighter for Airbus. Since its launch, this ambivalent relationship has fueled persistent tensions that are undermining the program's progress.
Coopetitive tensions within the Scaf project
The tensions between Dassault and Airbus Defense and Space primarily concern the division of tasks and project governance. Initially, an agreement provided for an equal split (50/50), with Dassault designated as the prime contractor due to its expertise. But in 2019, Spain's integration led the states to propose a three-way split.
The rebalancing, perceived as a challenge to Dassault's central role, marked the beginning of a conflict that has never subsided. Airbus considers the distribution unfair and disputes French project management, while Dassault refuses to back down. In the absence of an agreement, phase 1B of the program, aimed at building a flight demonstrator, has been blocked.
The tensions also concern knowledge sharing, an issue directly linked to sovereignty issues. Berlin has asked Dassault to open up access to certain technologies, which the French manufacturer has refused for fear of an unwanted transfer of knowledge. However, Airbus Defense and Space believes that without this exchange, it will not be able to fully benefit from the joint development. Angela Merkel already emphasized in 2021 that "issues of industrial property, task sharing, and leadership" remained central. The CEO of Dassault responded: "If I share my background today and the program is canceled in two years, how will I be protected from the competition?" https://www.youtube.com/embed/a9czGLMncO4?wmode=transparent&start=0
A political compromise was reached at the end of 2022 between Paris and Berlin to unblock phase 1B and confirm Dassault's role. However, disagreements persist and are once again slowing down the program, at the risk of compromising the rest of the project. Dassault Aviation is calling for clearer governance in order to have the necessary latitude to perform its role as prime contractor for pillar 1 (aircraft development).
"The question arises as to the effectiveness of the project, which brings together three countries [...] where there is no real leader but three 'co-co-cos'. [...] How can I provide leadership when I am faced with someone who weighs twice as much as me? How can I run a program when I don't even have the right to choose my subcontractors in France, Spain, and Germany? This is not the right way to fly a plane," summarized Éric Trappier, CEO of Dassault Aviation, on July 22.
Airbus Defense and Space, for its part, refuses to accept any change in governance. "If people want SCAF to exist, we all know how to make it happen. We just need to go back to what was agreed and stick to it. But if some people think we need to start from scratch, that's not acceptable," said CEO Michael Schoellhorn on June 19, 2025, at the Paris Air Show.
As a result, the project remains stuck in phase 1B, which is supposed to lead to a flight demonstrator. For now, the "air combat system of the future" still exists only on paper. A long cooperative road still lies ahead.
The SCAF is at the heart of a debate involving sovereignty, coopetition between states and companies, and the sharing of technological expertise. Coopetitive tensions are jeopardizing its progress, while states, which are much more than mere financiers, appear to be the real political orchestrators and arbiters of this fragile coopetition. "We will make a decision on the future of the project at the end of the year," Friedrich Merz warned at the end of August, pointing out that the process "cannot go on indefinitely" and that it is now imperative to "break the deadlock and move forward, because the project cannot tolerate any further delays." But how?
Managing cooperative tensions
Research on coopetition shows that coopetitive projects are fraught with paradoxical situations that firms must learn to manage (Le Roy et al., 2024). Coopetitors must simultaneously share and protect their knowledge, co-create value while seeking to appropriate it individually, and develop trust while cultivating a certain degree of mistrust. Their strategic interests may diverge, generating tensions related to opportunistic behavior or project governance, as illustrated by the Scaf case. If these tensions are not anticipated and managed, they may hinder the collaborative dynamic and slow down the progress of projects.
The management of coopetitive projects therefore requires appropriate measures: structural separation between cooperative and competitive activities, individual integration of coopetitive paradoxes, and the implementation of specific formal and informal mechanisms.
In some cases, the literature also highlights the importance of using a third party capable of acting as a neutral orchestrator. For example, research on the European Galileo program, a flagship program of the European space industry involving competitors OHB, Thales Alenia Space, and Airbus Defense and Space, reveals the cooperative tensions within the project that fueled tensions between the cooperators (Rouyre et al., 2019).
Each player suspected the others of being "free riders" or "knowledge hunters," thereby hindering the sharing of strategic information. To overcome these obstacles, the European Space Agency (ESA) took on the role of neutral coordinator to centralize knowledge flows, clearly divide industrial responsibilities, formalize processes, and provide technical coordination. This formal governance helped to limit tensions and ensure the project's success.
The need to manage coopetition and its tensions highlights two major areas of concern for Scaf. First, the apparent lack of mechanisms suited to managing a coopetitive project (separation of activities, integration of paradoxes, formal and informal mechanisms). Second, the absence of a neutral orchestrator between the two coopetitors. Drawing inspiration from the coopetition management mechanisms identified by management science research could offer concrete ways to better contain these tensions and give new impetus to this highly strategic project for European sovereignty.
Mastering coopetition management: a key challenge for the future of European defense
The SCAF project reflects Europe's dilemmas: the need to cooperate in order to exert influence alongside the major powers, but also the desire to protect national companies.
It shows that one of the major challenges in building a European defense system lies in the ability to manage cooperative projects involving companies and states with divergent interests. Two scenarios are possible. If SCAF succeeds, it could become a symbol of shared sovereignty and collaborative innovation between European competitors: a model that could be transposed to space, artificial intelligence, or cyber security. On the other hand, failure would send a worrying signal. It would not only mean the abandonment of a strategic program for Europe, but also demonstrate the structural limits of the ambition to build a genuine European defense.
The fundamental challenge is therefore clear: learning to manage coopetition at the European level on issues of sovereignty in order to turn it into a lever for innovation, rather than allowing it to become a field of paralyzing rivalries.
Chloé Zanardi, Assistant Professor, TBS Education and Frédéric Le Roy, Professor of Strategic Management – MOMA and Montpellier Business School, University of Montpellier
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Readthe original article.