The Russia-Ukraine war: Analysis of African countries' votes at the UN
In recent weeks, the world has witnessed the most tense situation in international relations since the end of the Cold War with Russia's invasion of Ukraine. These tensions were evident during the deliberations and vote by United Nations members on resolutions calling on Russia to end its invasion and withdraw its forces from Ukraine. These events have also tested the resilience of military and political alliances.
Mahama Tawat, University of Montpellier
The 54 African countries (representing 27.97% of the total vote) had a significant influence on the outcome.
First, a meeting with the 12 members of the Security Council was held on February 25, 2021. The three countries representing Africa, namely Gabon, Ghana, and Kenya, along with eight other countries, voted in favor of the resolution. However, Russia used its veto power to block it. This veto prompted the United States and 94 countries to convene an emergency meeting of the UN General Assembly on February 27, 2022, during which a similar, but non-binding, motion was presented. This is the first emergency meeting of this Assembly in 40 years.
The resolution condemning, among other things, Russia's decision to "raise the alert level of its nuclear forces" was adopted by the two-thirds majority required by all member states.
African votes were less unanimous in the General Assembly than in the Security Council, where the allocation of non-permanent seats, even if it follows a certain geographical distribution, does not oblige the representative countries to be the spokespersons for their region.
The majority of African countries clearly sided with Ukraine—28 out of 54 (51.85%). Only Eritrea voted against the resolution. But nearly a third of them abstained from taking sides (17 out of 54)—assuming that abstention is halfway between yes and no. Eight countries were absent.
My research focused on the similarities and differences in countries' responses to crises. For example, I looked at the 2015 refugee crisis in Europe and the contrasting responses of Western and Eastern European countries, which I explained by their different identities, i.e., "who are we?"
I also examined the Valletta Joint Action Plan, an immigration pact signed by the European Union and the African Union in response to the refugee crisis. I demonstrated that the plan, which helped to revive relations between the AU and the EU, was based on interdependence, which allows the parties to preserve their interests (territorial integrity for Europeans and economic development for Africans), while recognizing (especially the more powerful Europeans) that they need each other to assert those interests.
Research conducted by authors such as Dutch political scientist Erik Voeten also shows that voting in the General Assembly is generally motivated by interests. However, as American political scientist Alexander Wendt has revealed, what constitutes an interest depends on each government's perception, to such an extent that two rival countries may sometimes vote for the same resolution.
As Voeten pointed out, historically speaking, electoral trends have been influenced by the major issues of the day. In the 1950s, colonialism pitted European countries against Asian and African countries; from the 1960s to the 1980s, it was the Cold War and the division between the Eastern and Western blocs. More recently, these electoral trends have been shaped by developing countries' desire to obtain or preserve aid from developed countries and, increasingly, by the liberal-illiberal divide between democratic and authoritarian regimes.
This divide outweighs other possible explanations for the voting patterns at the emergency General Assembly meeting on the invasion of Ukraine. The degree of a country's closeness to the West or Russia may also serve as an additional explanation.
The dividing line
The group of 28 African countries in favor of the resolution was mainly composed of democracies aligned with the West, such as Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, and Zambia.
However, a few non-democratic or hybrid regimes were included in the list, such as Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Libya, Chad, Egypt, Mauritania, Rwanda, and Somalia. They did, however, have one thing in common: they were allies of the West, with close military ties (military bases and joint military operations against jihadists).
Conversely, most of the 17 African countries that abstained or, like Eritrea, voted against the resolution, are authoritarian or hybrid regimes; including Algeria, Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.
Some of these countries have close military and ideological ties with Russia, dating back in some cases to the Cold War, such as Algeria, Angola, Congo, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Mali, and the Central African Republic.
There were, however, some notable exceptions to the rule.
A number of functioning democracies—Namibia, South Africa, and Senegal—also abstained. All have strong affinities with the West. However, in the case of Namibia and South Africa, their ruling parties (the South West Africa People's Organization and the African National Congress, respectively) received support from the Soviet Union during their struggles for independence.
The case of Senegal is more confusing, as this country is the darling of the West due to its long democratic tradition. The Senegalese government stated that its abstention was in line with the "principles of non-alignment and peaceful settlement of disputes." However, the official statement by its president, as chair of the African Union, as well as that of the chair of the AU Commission, could be interpreted as support for Ukraine's territorial integrity.
This liberal and illiberal divide conveys three types of viewpoints.
Firstly, the world is being shaken by the kind of clash of civilizations predicted by American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington, who claimed that cultural identity would be the fault line of global conflicts. This would pave the way for global civilizations: Western, Chinese, Islamic, Latin, Slavic, and perhaps African.
While his idea of a clash—with identity as the driving force—seems to be coming to fruition, this identity is based on ideology rather than culture, with illiberalism having replaced communism.
Simply put, we had not yet reached the stage of democratic triumph proclaimed by American political scientist Francis Fukuyama in his book The End of History, published in 1992 after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Secondly, authoritarian regimes find comfort and support for their survival in proximity to similar regimes, which serve as a kind of insurance policy. Given that Russia has shown its determination to come to the aid of authoritarian regimes such as Syria, these countries do not want to rule out the possibility of seeking Russia's help if their survival is threatened.
Thirdly, if the war in Ukraine escalates globally and a Cold War 2.0 involving China takes hold, African countries would split into several blocs instead of presenting a united front.
Set against the backdrop of the renewed partnership between the EU and the AU, this divide is even more significant now than it was at their summit in Brussels a week before the conflict broke out, during which they proclaimed a shared vision for 2030 and sought to form a strategic alliance.
When it comes to democracy and alignment, the EU could probably set more requirements and will naturally seek to deepen its relations with like-minded African countries.
Mahama Tawat, Research Fellow, University of Montpellier
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.