The Russia-Ukraine war: Deciphering the vote by African countries at the UN

In recent weeks, the world has witnessed the most tense situation in international relations since the end of the Cold War, with Russia's invasion of Ukraine. These tensions were palpable as UN members deliberated and voted on resolutions calling on Russia to halt its invasion and withdraw its forces from Ukraine. These events also tested the resilience of military and political alliances.

Mahama Tawat, University of Montpellier

The 54 African countries (27.97% of the total vote) had a considerable influence on the vote.

Firstly, a meeting with the 12 members of the Security Council was held on February 25, 2021. The three countries representing Africa - Gabon, Ghana and Kenya - and eight other countries voted in favor of the resolution. However, Russia used its veto power to block it. This veto prompted the USA and 94 countries to call an emergency meeting of the UN General Assembly on February 27, 2022, at which a similar, but non-binding, motion was tabled. This was the Assembly's first emergency meeting in 40 years.

The resolution, which, among other things, condemned Russia's decision "to raise the alert level of its nuclear forces", was adopted by the two-thirds majority required of all member states.

African votes were less unanimous at the General Assembly than at the Security Council, where the allocation of non-permanent seats, even if they are geographically distributed, does not oblige representative countries to speak on behalf of their region.

The majority of African countries clearly sided with Ukraine - 28 out of 54 (51.85%). Only Eritrea voted against the resolution. But almost a third of them abstained from taking sides (17 out of 54) - assuming that abstention is halfway between a yes and a no. Eight countries were absent.

My research has focused on the similarities and differences in countries' reactions to crises. As an example, I looked at the 2015 refugee crisis in Europe and the contradictory reactions of Western and Eastern European countries, which I explained by their different identities, i.e. "who are we?".

I also examined the Valletta Joint Action Plan, an immigration pact signed by the European Union and the African Union in response to the refugee crisis. I demonstrated that the plan, which has helped to revitalize relations between the AU and the EU, was based on the interdependence that enables the parties to preserve their interests (territorial integrity for the Europeans and economic development for the Africans), while recognizing (especially the more powerful Europeans) that they need each other to assert these interests.

Research by authors such as the Dutch political scientist Erik Voeten also proves that voting at the General Assembly is - in general - interest-driven. But, as American political scientist Alexander Wendt has revealed, what constitutes an interest depends on the perception of each government, to such an extent that two rival countries can sometimes vote for the same resolution.

As Voeten points out, historically speaking, electoral trends have been influenced by the major issues of the day. In the 1950s, colonialism pitted European countries against Asian and African countries; from the 1960s to the 1980s, it was the Cold War and the division between the Eastern and Western blocs. More recently, these electoral trends have been structured by the desire of developing countries to obtain or preserve aid from developed countries and, increasingly, between the liberal, illiberal divide of democratic and authoritarian regimes.

This cleavage outweighs other possible explanations for the voting patterns of the emergency General Assembly meeting on the invasion of Ukraine. A country's degree of proximity to the West or Russia may also serve as an additional explanation.

The demarcation line

The group of 28 African countries in favor of the resolution was largely made up of democracies aligned with the West: Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Tunisia and Zambia.

But there were a few non-democratic or hybrid regimes on the list, such as Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Libya, Chad, Egypt, Mauritania, Rwanda and Somalia. What they had in common, however, was that they were Western allies, with close military ties (military bases and joint military operations against jihadists).

Conversely, most of the 17 African countries that abstained or, like Eritrea, voted against the resolution, are authoritarian or hybrid regimes, including Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, South Sudan, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.

Some of these countries have close military and ideological ties with Russia, sometimes dating back to the Cold War, such as Algeria, Angola, Congo, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Mali and the Central African Republic.

There were a few notable exceptions to the rule.

A number of functioning democracies - Namibia, South Africa and Senegal - also abstained. All have strong affinities with the West. However, in the case of Namibia and South Africa, their ruling parties (the South West African People's Organization, respectively) received support from the Soviet Union during their struggles for independence.

The case of Senegal is more puzzling, this country being the darling of the West because of its long democratic tradition. The Senegalese government declared that its abstention was in line with the "principles of non-alignment and the peaceful settlement of disputes". However, the official statement by its President, as current Chairman of the African Union, and that of the Chairman of the AU Commission, could be interpreted as support for Ukraine's territorial integrity.

This liberal/illiberal divide conveys views of three kinds.

Firstly, the world is being turned upside down by the kind of clash of civilizations predicted by the American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington, who argued that cultural identity would be the fault line of global conflicts. This would pave the way for global civilizations: Western, Chinese, Islamic, Latin, Slavic and perhaps African.
If his idea of confrontation - and identity as the driving force - seems to be coming true, this identity is based on ideology, not culture, as illiberalism has replaced communism.

Quite simply, we had not yet reached the stage of the triumph of democracy proclaimed by the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama in his book The End of History, published in 1992 after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Secondly, authoritarian regimes find comfort and support for their survival in proximity to similar regimes, and it serves as an insurance policy. Since Russia has shown its determination to help authoritarian regimes such as Syria, these countries do not want to rule out the possibility of recourse to Russia's help, should their survival be threatened.

Thirdly, if the war in Ukraine escalates on a global scale, and a Cold War 2.0 including China takes hold, African countries will split into several blocs instead of presenting a common front.

Placed in the context of the renewed partnership between the EU and the AU, this divide makes even more sense now than it did at their Brussels summit, a week before the conflict broke out, when they proclaimed a shared vision for 2030 and sought to form a strategic alliance.

When it comes to democracy and alignment, the EU could probably make more demands, and will naturally seek to deepen its relations with like-minded African countries.

Mahama Tawat, Research fellow, University of Montpellier

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.