The "anti-elitist" elite: a French paradox
The results of the presidential election have led many observers to believe that France would be divided into three camps: a governing center, a right wing comprising both conservative and extremist factions, and a left wing largely aligned with its radical wing.
William Genieys, Sciences Po and Mohammad-Saïd Darviche, University of Montpellier
Factors in electoral sociology—such as voter abstention, generational divides, and lifestyle differences —explain why this is not simply a repeat of the 2017 scenario. Indeed, the “Yellow Vests” crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic have intensified the sense of “loathing” toward politicians representing the ruling parties. Emmanuel Macron embodies this aversion particularly well.
Is there a trend toward a unified stance against the “elites”?
Few of these analysts, however, have highlighted the unprecedented success of candidates who present themselves as anti-elitist.
The term “elite” derives from the verb eligere (“to choose”), a Latin term in use in France as early as the12th century. In modern times, “elite” and “elitism” refer to a select group of “chosen” individuals within society who are destined to lead the “unchosen,” a concept linked to the idea of merit. In contrast to aristocracy, elitism has a positive social and political connotation. Anti-elitism is a radical critique of this conception. Applied to political life today, it amounts to a questioning of the “meritocratic” nature of competence—and thus the legitimacy—of the elites in representative democracy.
This is how we describe the candidates who, during the campaign, employed anti-elitist rhetoric. The far right— Éric Zemmour, Marine Le Pen—the sovereigntist right— Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, Jean Lassalle, as well as candidates from the radical left— Jean-Luc Mélenchon, Philippe Poutou, and Nathalie Artaud —have vilified the power of the “oligarchy,” the “powerful,” “finance,” the “caste,” “those at the top,” and so on.
Candidates who employed this rhetoric in the first round of presidential elections between 2012 and 2022 saw their share of the vote steadily increase: 33% in 2012; 49.8% in 2017; and 61.1% in 2022. While we cannot really establish a causal link between this rhetoric and these results, we can assume that this rhetoric did not offend voters to the point of dissuading them from voting for these candidates.
Rhetoric against representative democracy
This anti-elitist rhetoric —which populist leaders have been promoting for over a decade—transcends the left-right divide.
As Jacques Julliard points out, the social movement of 1995 marked a historic turning point that made anti-elitist rhetoric “one of the standard tropes of political discourse.” Since then, it has become central not only to the most radical discourses on the right but also, increasingly, to those on the left, particularly among La France insoumise. Gérald Bronner notes that even more moderate professional politicians do not shy away from employing this form of “cognitive demagoguery.” Everyone will recall the slogan “My opponent is the world of finance!” launched by François Hollande during the 2012 election campaign. In this context, rational arguments lose their relevance, since even those who should champion them discard them in the name of electoral expediency.
From this perspective, the oligarchy of “the rich, the political caste,” and the technocrats of the “deep state (whether French or Brussels-based)” must go. This call to rid ourselves of the elite is inseparable from the division of the world into the (good) people and the (evil) elite. Shouldn’t good naturally drive out evil? Typically part of the conceptual framework of the far right, this reduction of political struggle to religious categories has also been theorized by the so-called “radical” left.
The philosopher Chantal Mouffe thus calls for the rejection of reason—the foundation of liberal democracy—in favor of“libidinal energy.” She proposes to “mobilize” this “malleable” energy against the oligarchy in order to “build” the “people.” From this perspective, emotions and affects must translate into a “physical and visceral” rejection of the elite, as suggested by Representative François Ruffin.
Moreover, anti-elitism is presented as a political discourse capable of “saving” democracy. According to its proponents, contemporary elitism runs counter to the egalitarian ideal and overshadows major emancipatory projects in favor of neoliberal globalization.
The Rise of the Decline of "Grand Narratives"
This anti-elitism draws its strength from the decline of “grand narratives” (liberalism, socialism, etc.) and is now readily co-opted by critics of representative democracy. This ideological fuel for leaderless social movements, such as the “Yellow Vests,” makes it possible to mobilize an ever-wider electorate around a purported divide between the “elite bloc” and the “popular bloc.”
The reasoning of these critics of the “oligarchy” is based on a “gross oversimplification”: the myth of the existence of a “Conscious, Coherent, and Conspiratorial” elite (the “3 C ”model ), which James Meisel has criticized for distorting the theory of the ruling class . Indeed, this oversimplification makes it easy to associate any form of elite mediation with conspiracy theories.
In populist discourse, the idea of a unified elite pursuing its own interests stands in sharp contrast to the notion—more consistent with democratic pluralism—of a multitude of elite groups competing for political, religious, social, and economic power.
In the United States, since the administration of George W. Bush, studies have pointed to the role of a“shadow elite ” that allegedly promoted the Second Gulf War. However, the argument regarding the intertwining of neoconservative networks and the foreign policy apparatus is based on research whose scientific rigor is questionable. More empirically robust research has thus shown that, in the case of health insurance reform, interest groups (Big Pharma, insurance companies, etc.) did not play such a role with the Obama administration. Yet, despite the lack of evidence, the myth of an omnipotent elite influencing all democratic decisions persists. Against a backdrop of a crisis of confidence in those in power, it reinforces the belief in anti-elitism.
The Elite of Anti-Elitism: Another Oligarchy?
Taking this sociological line of reasoning further, one could argue that certain leaders who employ anti-elitist rhetoric also constitute an elite. British diplomat and former Conservative minister George Walden has described the emergence of an “upper-caste elite of anti-elitists” composed of individuals from highly privileged social backgrounds, such as Prime Ministers David Cameron and Boris Johnson. Both are products of the elite Eton-Oxford educational track.
In France, the anti-elite elite is characterized by its profile as professional political career. Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon are emblematic examples of this, as evidenced by their careers and partisan leadership. The former is a “political heiress” who entered politics at the age of 18, rising through the ranks of the National Front before running for president since 2012. The latter is a “product of the French-style meritocracy,” having earned his CAPES in modern literature while simultaneously joining the Socialist Party in 1976.
Throughout his long political career, he has held various elected offices, including those of member of the National Assembly, senator, and member of the European Parliament, as well as the executive position of Minister Delegate for Vocational Education (2000–2002). Since founding his own party (Le Parti de Gauche in 2008, which became La France Insoumise in 2016), he has also run for president three times. Furthermore, both have established unchallenged leadership within their political parties, as evidenced by their continuous re-election to the leadership. This iron grip on the organization illustrates the iron law of oligarchy so dear to Roberto Michels.
The criteria used in the sociology of elites—namely, social background, education, career path, length of political career, holding multiple offices, and the nature of their positions—reveal, unsurprisingly, how little distinguishes them from those they criticize.
William Genieys, CNRS Research Director at the CEE, Sciences Po and Mohammad-Saïd Darviche, Associate Professor, University of Montpellier
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Readthe original article.