The "anti-elitist" elite: a French paradox
The results of the presidential election led many observers to believe that France would be divided into three camps: a center of government, a right wing bringing together conservative and extremist factions, and a left wing largely aligned with its radical wing.
William Genieys, Sciences Po and Mohammad-Saïd Darviche, University of Montpellier
Variables in electoral sociology, abstentionism, and divisions between generations or lifestyles explain why this is not simply a repeat of the 2017 scenario. Indeed, the "yellow vest" crisis and the Covid-19 crisis have accentuated the feeling of "hatred" towards politicians representing the governing parties. Emmanuel Macron particularly embodies this hatred.
Towards a consensus against the "elites"?
However, few of these analysts highlighted the unprecedented victory of candidates claiming to be anti-elitist.
The term "elite" comes from the verb eligere ("to choose"), a Latin term in use in France since the12th century. In contemporary times, "elite" and "elitism" refer to a certain number of "chosen" individuals within society who are destined to lead the "unchosen" by associating the notion of merit with it. In contrast to aristocracy, elitism has a positive social and political connotation. Anti-elitism is a radical critique of this concept. Applied to political life today, it challenges the "meritocratic" nature of competence and therefore the legitimacy of elites in representative democracy.
We thus describe candidates who used anti-elitist rhetoric during the campaign. The far right, Éric Zemmour, Marine Le Pen, the sovereignist right, Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, Jean Lassalle, but also candidates from the radical left, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, Philippe Poutou, and Nathalie Artaud, vilified the power of the "oligarchy," the "powerful," "finance," the "caste," "those at the top," etc.
Candidates who used this rhetoric in the first round of presidential elections between 2012 and 2022 obtained a steadily increasing number of votes: 33% in 2012; 49.8% in 2017; and 61.1% in 2022. While it is not possible to establish a causal link between this rhetoric and these results, it can be assumed that this rhetoric did not shock voters to the point of dissuading them from voting for these candidates.
Rhetoric against representative democracy
This anti-elitist rhetoric —relayed by populist leaders for more than a decade—transcends the left-right divide.
As Jacques Julliard points out, the social movement of 1995 was the historic moment that made anti-elitist rhetoric "one of the obligatory topos of political discourse." Since then, it has become central to the most radical discursive styles of the right, but also increasingly of the left, particularly of La France Insoumise. Gérald Bronner points out that even more moderate professional politicians do not shy away from using this form of "cognitive demagoguery." Everyone will remember François Hollande's "my opponent is the world of finance!" during the 2012 election campaign. In this context, rational arguments lose their legitimacy, since even those who should be promoting them discard them in the name of electoral profitability.
From this perspective, the oligarchy of "the rich, the political caste" and the technocrats of the "deep state (French or Brussels)" must go. This call to get rid of the elite is consubstantial with the division of the world between the (good) people and the (evil) elite. Shouldn't good naturally drive out evil? Usually part of the conceptual baggage of the far right, this reduction of political struggle to religious categories has also been theorized by the so-called "radical" left.
The philosopher Chantal Mouffe thus calls for the repudiation of reason, the foundation of liberal democracy, in favor of"libidinal energy." She proposes to "mobilize" this "malleable" energy against the oligarchy in order to "build" the "people." From this perspective, emotions and affects must translate into a "physical and visceral" rejection of the elite, as suggested by Congressman François Ruffin.
Furthermore, anti-elitism is presented as a political discourse that can "save" democracy. For its proponents, contemporary elitism runs counter to the egalitarian ideal and obscures major emancipation projects in favor of neoliberal globalization.
The mobilization of the decline of "grand narratives"
This anti-elitism draws its strength from the decline of "grand narratives" (liberalism, socialism, etc.) and is now easily appropriated by critics of representative democracy. This ideological fuel for decapitated social movements, such as the "yellow vests," makes it possible to mobilize an ever-wider electorate around a supposed divide between the "elite bloc" and the "popular bloc."
The reasoning of these critics of the "oligarchy" is based on a "terrible simplification": the myth of the existence of a "Conscious, Coherent, and Conspiratorial" elite (the "3 Cs "model ), criticized by James Meisel for distorting the theory of ruling class . Indeed, this shortcut facilitates the association of any type of elite mediation with conspiracy theories.
In populist discourse, the idea of a unified elite maximizing its interests strongly competes with the idea—more consistent with democratic pluralism—of a multiplicity of elite groups competing for political, religious, social, and economic power.
In the United States, since the administration of George W. Bush, studies have referred to the role of a "shadow elite " that allegedly promoted the second Gulf War. However, the demonstration of the interpenetration of neoconservative networks and the foreign affairs administration is based on work whose scientific validity is debatable. More empirically sound research has shown that, in the case of health insurance reform, interest groups (big pharma, insurance companies, etc.) did not play such a role in the Obama administration. Yet, despite the lack of evidence, the myth of an omnipotent elite influencing all democratic decisions persists. In a context of crisis of confidence in government, it reinforces the belief in anti-elitism.
The elite of anti-elitism: another oligarchy?
Taking this sociological reasoning further, we could conclude that certain leaders who use anti-elitist rhetoric also form an elite. British diplomat and former Conservative minister George Walden described the emergence of an " upper-caste elite of anti-elitists" composed of individuals from highly privileged social backgrounds, such as Prime Ministers David Cameron and Boris Johnson. Both are products of the elite Eton-Oxford educational system.
In France, the anti-elite elite is characterized by its professional background in professional politician. Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon are emblematic examples of this, as demonstrated by their careers and partisan leadership. The former is a "political heiress" who entered the profession at the age of 18, before climbing the ranks of the National Front and running for president in 2012. The latter is a "product of French-style meritocracy," obtaining his CAPES in modern literature and joining the Socialist Party in 1976.
During his long political career, he has held elected office as a member of parliament, senator, member of the European Parliament, and executive office as Minister Delegate for Vocational Education (2000-2002). Since founding his own party (Le Parti de Gauche in 2008, which became La France Insoumise in 2016), he has also run for president three times. Furthermore, both have established undisputed leadership over their political parties, as evidenced by their continued re-election to leadership positions. This iron grip on the organization illustrates Roberto Michels' iron law of oligarchy.
The criteria used in the sociology of elites, namely social background, education, career path, length of political career, accumulation of mandates, and type of mandates, unsurprisingly show how little distance separates them from those they denounce.
William Genieys, CNRS Research Director at CEE, Sciences Po and Mohammad-Saïd Darviche, Senior Lecturer, University of Montpellier
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