Marine Le Pen: A Campaign Full of Paradoxes
Everything seemed new in Marine Le Pen’s third presidential campaign. Over the past ten years, her vote total in the first round has risen from 6,421,426 in 2012 to 7,678,491 (and then 10,638,475 in the second round) in 2017, and finally to 8,136,369 on April 10 of this year.
Emmanuel Négrier, University of Montpellier and Julien Audemard
This gain is all the more significant given that it continued despite the presence of a formidable challenger from the far right, Éric Zemmour (2,485,935 votes in the first round).
Have these changes lent credibility to Marine Le Pen’s candidacy beyond her usual, demagogic stance? In any case, they run up against certain limitations and paradoxes that we propose to explain.
A Programmatic Reorientation
The trauma of the 2017 debate between the two rounds—where the candidate’s lack of preparation for the policy showdown was glaringly obvious—must have convinced the National Rally of one obvious fact: a campaign whose goal is to appear not only worthy of representation but also capable of governing requires in-depth work on the platform. If the strategy is to win over a growing segment of a right-wing electorate in need of leadership, then this platform must be tailored to the makeup of that electorate—which is notoriously older and more conservative—and for whom dramatic measures (such as “Frexit,” for example) are seen as nothing more than undesirable adventures.
Although Gilles Ivaldi identifies a greater number of “social” measures, Marine Le Pen’s platform is not “more left-leaning” than it was in 2017—quite the contrary.
Overall, the platform still leans to the right, with measures such as increased exemptions from inheritance tax, the abandonment of retirement at age 60 for everyone, and—after some hesitation—the rejection of a return to the Solidarity Tax on Wealth (ISF). Not to mention, of course, what remains—symbolically—the social and economic pillar of Le Pen’s platform: overt and systematic discrimination between French citizens and foreigners when it comes to social, health, and educational benefits.
A Significant Development in Communication
The shift in communication strategy is, however, evident, and it is due in particular to a transformation within Marine Le Pen’s inner circle, where Florian Philippot had largely dominated the 2017 campaign. In 2022, she was surrounded by advisors drawn primarily from the world of expertise, symbolized by the think tank “Les Horaces,” which somewhat mimics “Les Gracques”—a social-liberal think tank founded during the 2007 presidential campaign and which later contributed to Emmanuel Macron’s 2017 campaign. As aptly described by journalist Géraldine Woessner, the Horaces—which were established as a think tank in 2015—had remained on the sidelines of the 2017 campaign.
While we should not overstate their number or significance within the French elite, valuable reinforcements have arrived from members of ministerial staffs, Énarques, and representatives of the medical, social, and economic sectors—such as Jean-Philippe Tanguy (ESSEC, Sciences Po Paris), a former aide to Nicolas Dupont-Aignan who, at age 35, became deputy campaign manager for Marine Le Pen. The professionalization of Marine Le Pen’s inner circle has thus come at the risk of appearing more “traditionally” right-wing than disruptive.
To support this refocusing, the campaign’s style has also been significantly altered. The elimination of harsh and potentially anxiety-inducing measures has been offset by an effort to soften the candidate’s image (the aunt grieved by her niece’s betrayal, the portrayal of her relationship with cats, the care taken in welcoming people and maintaining a polite dialogue during her visits to various campaign locations). The reduced emphasis on rallies compared to “micro-group” visits has also reinforced the impression of a low-key campaign, one that could potentially help dispel negative perceptions.
But the main factor that refocused Marine Le Pen’s campaign came from outside and against her very will. This is Éric Zemmour’s primary role, one that proved all the more useful in the first round as it validated the RN candidate’s efforts to appear more “democratically” acceptable, in contrast to the polemicist’s excesses.
Éric Zemmour's Three Roles
Éric Zemmour played three roles in Le Pen’s campaign. The first was to amplify the presence of far-right themes—issues of identity and immigration—which are generally attributed to him. Voiced loudly (by Zemmour) and transformed into a public policy platform (by Le Pen), these themes, in just a few months, expanded the Overton window to include opinions deemed worthy of public debate.
According to Joseph P. Overton (1960–2003), “expanding the window of opinion” is a process that involves shifting ideas from being initially considered “unthinkable” to “radical,” then “reasonable,” and finally “popular,” ultimately leading to the adoption of public policies. Among these ideas in 2022 is, of course, the “Great Replacement” theory, which even some representatives of the Republican right—led by Valérie Pécresse—have embraced.
Éric Zemmour’s second role has been to serve as a populist voice, characterized by an unapologetic radicalism that, in turn, has acted as a “lightning rod” for the RN candidate. The best example here is the reference to the dream of a “French Putin,” which, through its extremity, has effectively shielded Marine Le Pen from overly insistent mention of her own ties—which are at least as clear—to the Russian president and his inner circle, particularly in the banking sector. During the April 20 debate, Emmanuel Macron’s reference to these ties certainly served to unsettle her.
Zemmour’s third role is, ultimately, electoral. While the far right has, over the years, tended to perform quite well in the first round of a majority-vote election, it suffers in the second round from a lack of support and cross-party endorsements. This time, Zemmour’s voter base—which has penetrated affluent segments that are typically resistant to voting for Le Pen— appears poised to contribute to a more open second round, assuming the two can join forces.
Stéphane Coursière/CEPEL, Courtesy of the author
Stéphane Coursière/CEPEL, Courtesy of the author
The first-round map shows just how different the two electorates are on an interregional scale. However, when focusing solely on Occitanie, we also see that Zemmour’s support is strong in the very same areas where Le Pen’s vote is high: Aude, Gard, Pyrénées-Orientales, and Hérault. This observation can be extended to the entire coastline. Marine Le Pen received 26.6% of the vote compared to Éric Zemmour’s 14% in the Alpes-Maritimes; the figures were 26.2% and 10.8% in the Bouches-du-Rhône, and 30.6% and 13.3% in the Var. But this map of potential vote shifts may highlight one of the paradoxes of Marine Le Pen’s 2022 campaign, which now needs to be emphasized.
Two electoral districts
One limitation of Marine Le Pen’s campaign strategy is evident in the geographic distribution of votes in her favor: a comparison of the 2017 and 2022 maps first reveals the great stability of the RN electorate. While there has indeed been, to a certain extent, an expansion of electoral support for Marine Le Pen, this is by no means a widespread trend that would indicate the mainstreaming of the far-right vote. The map of the RN vote from Sunday, April 10, reveals gaps precisely where the party’s efforts to shed its demonized image might have had an effect. This is particularly true in urban centers, where the RN candidate trails by a particularly wide margin, especially given that voter turnout was relatively consistent across different regions. In municipalities with more than 100,000 residents, Marine Le Pen received, on average, only 12.3% of the votes cast, compared to 29.5% for Emmanuel Macron and 31.3% for Jean-Luc Mélenchon.
This is also true in the western part of the country, which has traditionally been more resistant to voting for the RN—the voting divide between Le Havre and Perpignan persists, despite the RN’s rising vote share across much of mainland France, today just as it did in the 1980s.
Added to this first limitation is a sociological one. The moderation of the party’s rhetoric has not translated into an increase in the RN vote among the upper socioeconomic strata, and the party’s support remains, for the most part, a working-class vote. This populist paradox is all the more detrimental to Marine Le Pen in her quest for power because support for her faces competition from Mélenchon, who also performs very well among segments of the working class (lower-level civil servants and voters of immigrant origin), most of whom are hostile to the far right.
These two limitations mean that the RN’s voter base is likely still too niche to hope for a victory in the second round of the presidential election, despite the candidate’s intensified campaign, particularly in the west.
A political constraint
Finally, Marine Le Pen’s campaign strategy faces a third limitation, this time of a political nature. This limitation, which has been clearly evident during the period between the two rounds, consists of three elements.
The first highlights the limitations of the “expertise” card. The debate on April 20, 2022, demonstrated this. Often flustered and on the defensive regarding the most technical aspects of her platform, she failed to undermine the incumbent’s track record.
By treating Marine Le Pen (almost) as an ordinary rival, he has lent credibility to his change in strategy—his “de-demonization”—in order to better dominate her in the realm of governance. At the same time, the period between the two rounds highlighted the difficulties faced by the candidate and her inner circle in addressing recurring criticism of the RN’s traditional ideological foundation and its conservative and anti-immigration stances.
A second factor compounds this difficulty: despite her improving election results, Marine Le Pen still struggles to win over voters, including those on the right and, at times, even within her own camp. This struggle can be explained in large part by a third factor, which stems from the lingering stigma associated with the Le Pen name, which remains a source of disgrace for many.
On Sunday, April 24, a majority of voters will have to choose between two grim alternatives: the fear of a Le Pen presidency—the incumbent president’s trump card—and resentment toward Emmanuel Macron, which the RN candidate intends to exploit. For Marine Le Pen, this perilous choice hinges on two major factors: her ability to keep the working-class fringes—which she considers her base—engaged in the voting process beyond the presidential election, while simultaneously consolidating her territorial reach and the normalization of her political standing on which she relies.
From this perspective, bringing together the Le Pen and Zemmour electorates will undoubtedly be key to sustainable leadership. In the longer term, the challenge for the RN is to transcend the divide between the two popular blocs represented by the Le Pen and Mélenchon votes. Between respectability on the right and popular legitimacy, all the contradictions of a campaign are laid bare.
Emmanuel Négrier, CNRS Research Director in Political Science at CEPEL, University of Montpellier, University of Montpellier and Julien Audemard, Associate Research Scientist
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Readthe original article.