Policing the Police: From Theory to Practice
For several months now, police officers in general—and the IGPN in particular—have been the target of widespread criticism. Protests against pension reform, the “yellow vest” movement, demonstrations by high school students, and efforts to enforce emergency measures during the lockdown have highlighted the violent or abusive behavior of some police officers.
Stéphane Lemercier, University of Montpellier
Add to that the allegations of widespread racism within the police force following the death of George Floyd, an African American killed by a police officer in the United States —in a context that has nothing to do with that of French society—and the publication of a second opinion questioning the official account of Adama Traoré’s death at a gendarmerie in 2016: that was all it took to drive thousands of protesters into the streets to demonstrate against police violence.
Under pressure, the President even ordered the Minister of the Interior to expedite the completion of a study launched last January, which was intended to make recommendations for improving police conduct following the death of a man during a police operation.
But what exactly are we talking about? How and by whom is the French police force monitored? How are police forces in other countries monitored?
Police oversight in theory
In France, the oversight of misconduct within the police force is primarily the responsibility of the police officers themselves: Article R 434-26 of the Internal Security Code designates every police officer as a custodian of the Code of Ethics and a guarantor of its observance.
However, various studies have shown that the police culture is deeply ingrained, which discourages officers from reporting their colleagues. Nevertheless, Article 40 of the Code of Criminal Procedure stipulates that “any public official or civil servant who, in the course of their duties, becomes aware of a crime or misdemeanor, is required to notify the District Attorney without delay…”.
But this provision is rarely enforced.
Ultimately, the General Inspectorate of the National Police is the official body responsible for overseeing the police. It conducts administrative and criminal investigations into breaches of professional ethics and offenses committed by police officers. These investigators are feared by all public officials because they have a reputation for getting results, even though some sometimes question their effectiveness, independence, or impartiality.
But according to sociologist Sébastian Roché: “Having police officers investigate other police officers is not satisfactory.” He therefore suggests establishing an external oversight body that is independent of the French police, as is the case in many other countries.
Regulatory bodies in France and abroad
Such a regulatory body already exists in France: it is the Defender of Rights. This constitutional authority, established in 2011, is responsible for ensuring that security professionals adhere to ethical standards.
According to its latest annual report, published on June 8, 2020, for the year 2019, the agency handled 1,957 cases involving the conduct of security forces, compared with 1,520 the previous year.
This accounts for only 2.4% of its total caseload, far behind cases involving social security, traffic law, or criminal justice… But more importantly, the Ombudsman found ethical violations in only 10% of the cases handled!
Looking at the situation abroad, most police oversight bodies are members of the IPCAN (Independent Police Complaints Authority Network), a professional network for informal exchange and cooperation that primarily includes European countries, though not exclusively.
Geoff Caddick/AFP
In the United Kingdom,the Independent Office for Police Conduct is held up as a model for its transparency and its guarantee of independence. It is headed by an individual who has never served as a police officer, and its members are also prohibited from having been police officers.
In Quebec, there is a police ethics commissioner (often a former lawyer or judge) who receives complaints against police officers who have violated the Quebec Police Code of Ethics.
In Denmark, there is an independent police complaints authority that investigates criminal offenses committed by police officers. It is headed by a High Court judge who works with a prosecutor, a law professor, and two representatives from civil society. Its members are appointed by the Minister of Justice and must be replaced every four years.
In Norway, the Norwegian Bureau for the Investigation of Police Affairs is composed of former police officers and lawyers who investigate law enforcement officers suspected of committing criminal or ethical offenses. In Australia, there isthe Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI), headed by a judge and responsible for investigating police officers and combating corruption within the administration.
In Belgium, there is the Committee P, which is headed by a judge. Its members are appointed by the Chamber of Representatives. Its spokesperson states that “it is a body of the legislative branch established to assist the legislature in its oversight of the executive branch.”
Finally, in Switzerland, there is a Police Ombudsman’s Office, an independent body dedicated to fostering dialogue, providing information, and offering advice to the public; however, it has no authority to investigate or impose sanctions. The same is true in Spain, Ireland, Greece, Finland, Serbia, Slovakia, and Hungary, where “police ombudsmen” receive reports of inappropriate behavior by police officers and then refer them to the courts if they determine that a wrongdoing has occurred.
Police checks in practice
In France,the independence of the IGPN has often been called into question, even though its head insists she receives no instructions from senior leadership. The fact that it is a department reporting to the Director General of the National Police and the Minister of the Interior does not speak in its favor…
In terms of transparency, the IGPN has made positive strides in recent years with the publication of an annual report that provides statistics on its investigations. Since 2018, data on those injured or killed by the police has also been collected and made public. However, Cédric Moreau de Bellaing and Sébastian Roché, two researchers who examined dozens of proceedings initiated by the IGPN over a seven-year period, noted “a lack of sincerity in the search for the truth.”
Stephane De Sakutin/AFP
Claudine Angeli-Troccaz (Deputy to the Human Rights Defender in charge of security ethics issues) believes that:
“To ensure the proper functioning of democratic institutions, it is now essential not to reduce security issues to a mere accounting of resources or to a focus on confrontation and escalation, but rather to place ethics at the center of security debates and to do everything possible to foster a shift in professional cultures—a prerequisite for changing practices.”
It is high time to take drastic measures, and the creation of a College of General Inspectors within the Ministry of the Interior — established by an emergency decree issued on June 10, 2020—is not going to solve the problem… It is time to consider effective and innovative measures.
Reflective practices and potential developments
The IOPC (the French equivalent of the IGPN) regularly publishes a magazine for police departments called “Lessons Learned.” Each issue focuses on a specific topic: arrests, protest management, protecting vulnerable populations, and so on. Drawing on real-life situations, it details what went wrong and draws lessons to prevent similar setbacks from happening again.
This is already what the IGPN is doing regarding occupational risks through the AMARIS project (Improving Risk Management), which analyzes the most frequently encountered high-risk situations to propose a prevention strategy by creating awareness-raising fact sheets distributed to police stations. The IGPN could draw heavily on this approach to do the same with regard to poor police practices, and such cases could be raised and discussed during the initial training of police cadets and during continuing education for officers.
The IGPN should focus on its audit, support, and advisory functions for the departments that request them, and expand its role to include mediation between the police and the public, following the model of the Hungarian, Greek, or Finnish ombudsmen. It could leave the “administrative and judicial investigations” aspect to an external and independent authority, such as the National Commission on Security Ethics (the CNDS was established by Law No. 2000-494 of June 6, 2000). This administrative body, established by the Jospin government, was composed of four members of parliament, representatives from the Council of State, the Court of Cassation, the Court of Auditors, and six qualified individuals. It possessed significant legal powers, as professional secrecy could not be invoked against it, and any refusal to respond to it constituted a criminal offense. However, a lack of financial resources, competition with the IGPN, and the undermining efforts of certain police unions led to its dissolution in 2011.
France, which was a pioneer in police oversight with the creation in 1986 of the National Police Code of Ethics, followed by the establishment of the CNDS in 2000, has for too long been hesitant to address instances of inappropriate police conduct that tarnish the entire institution.
By implementing reflective practices based on the British model, redefining the IGPN’s mandate, and establishing a National Ethics Commission for Public Safety with sufficient resources, the police and police officers could regain a degree of legitimacy, and the public could once again have a police force it can rely on.
Stéphane Lemercier, Lecturer – Member of the Montpellier Criminal Law Team (EDPM), University of Montpellier
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