Will *La France insoumise* be able to sustain itself in the long run?
Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s third-place finish in the first round of the April 2022 presidential election is the culmination of a third successful campaign by the leader of France’s radical left, rather than the result of a long-term trend dating back to the launch of La France Insoumise.
Arthur Groz, University of Montpellier
Understanding the current state of this political structure requires an assessment of both its strengths in reshaping the national political landscape and the limitations it has encountered over the past six years since its founding.
During the 2010s, the electoral successes of Syriza in Greece and later of Podemos in Spain inspired a movement centered around the Left Party and Jean-Luc Mélenchon, which shared the view that attempts to form a “left-wing cartel”—a coalition of parties—had failed.
On Wednesday, February 10, 2016, during a television appearance, Jean-Luc Mélenchon surprised everyone by announcing his candidacy for the 2017 French presidential election. Only a few close associates had been informed of this decision, marking the end of the Front de Gauche and the launch of a new movement, La France Insoumise.
A structure inspired by prominent figures on the left
The success was immediate, facilitated by a minimalist, free online registration process typical of the new forms of political organizing emerging in Europe: by March 27, 2017, the campaign website had amassed 332,123 registered users. This structure, openly inspired by Podemos, seeks to reconcile the verticality of decision-making and the charismatic leadership of a traditional party with the horizontality of engagement through local support groups, characteristics of the “movement-parties” analyzed by Rémi Lefebvre.
The La France Insoumise candidate ultimately secured 19.58% of the vote in the first round of the 2017 presidential election, trailing closely behind the Les Républicains candidate—a breakthrough that was partially confirmed in June by the election of 17 members of parliament. Such early successes could have positioned La France Insoumise as the leading opposition force, a role it had set out to assume.
Five years later, the initial optimism has given way to significant disillusionment, though this has not led to the organization’s collapse. The “Insoumis” party label has lost its significance and is now merging into a broader identity that embodies the idea of a coalition of progressive forces under the name of the Popular Union.
This new label clearly references Salvador Allende’s Chilean Unidad Popular, as well as the legacy of the Common Program or, more recently, the Greek coalition Syriza, which brings together parties and organizations.
But both in its technical aspects (holograms of the candidate, coordinated social media campaigns) and in its policy platforms, the 2022 campaign is largely a repeat of the 2017 campaign.
The slight decline in turnout among both members and supporters at rallies and marches (in Marseille as well as in Paris) reflects a difficulty in sustaining long-term commitment to the movement. This extremely mixed picture can be attributed to both short-term factors and structural weaknesses that have become particularly evident in recent years.
The Successes and Failures of a Populist Strategy
The FI’s strategy, developed in 2017, can be described as “left-wing populist,” in line with the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. For these thinkers, the goal is to break the electoral deadlock in which the radical left finds itself by proposing a clear program.
This platform is structured around cross-cutting themes designed to appeal beyond the ranks of the left, with a particular focus on working-class voters who are inclined to abstain or cast a protest vote for the far right.
In the leader’s discourse, the Republic and national symbols are imbued with new meaning and intertwined with those inherited from protest movements. Both symbolically and in terms of the nature of the commitment, the break with traditional left-wing parties is complete: the party’s minimal structure prevents the formation of local fiefdoms, and the Insoumis conventions simply ratify the general direction defined beforehand. The network of Party of the Left cadres forms the backbone of the Insoumis movement on the ground.
"Standing on one's own two feet" doesn't prevent a crisis
To maintain momentum between two election cycles that lend themselves to political mobilization, the FI must “stand on its own two feet,” by organizing both within institutions and in the streets. Such episodes have marked the radical left in Southern Europe: the Indignados in Spain, the 2011 square-occupation movement in Greece, and the protests against the “Labor Law” in France in 2016 served as springboards for the emergence of new political forces that carried their demands into the parliaments.
But far from strengthening these movements, the rise to power of Syriza and Podemos at the municipal level has tended to coincide with a decline in social mobilization.
The same is true of the FI, which went through a major crisis between 2017 and 2019. Some of the original leaders, such as Thomas Guénolé, Charlotte Girard, and Georges Kuzmanovic, left the party at that time, disappointed by the lack of internal democratic mechanisms and shifts in policy.
With 11.03% in the first round of the 2017 legislative elections, followed by 4.86% in the second round, 6.31% in the 2019 European elections (winning 6 seats), as well as disappointing results for the “citizens’ lists” supported in the 2020 municipal elections, the results of La France Insoumise are in sharp decline.
The disconnect between emerging popular aspirations and political proposals geared toward young urban college graduates is particularly striking in 2019. Despite a potential convergence in their demands, the Yellow Vests movement thus offers no benefit to the FI, even though its activists quickly became involved.
The failure is clear: over the course of the five-year term, the FI has been unable to build a popular coalition around itself that would bring together those disillusioned with institutional politics while giving voice to emerging movements, in accordance with the role of the tribune so dear to political scientist Georges Lavau.
Grassroots activists are struggling to find their place in an organization that, while granting them considerable autonomy, is run in an extremely top-down manner. Efforts to establish a counter-hegemonic discourse through outlets such as Le Média or by rallying figures like MP François Ruffin are struggling to bear fruit in the cultural “war of position” inspired by the thought of Antonio Gramsci. Nevertheless, the lead it established over the rest of the French left in the previous presidential election remains intact.
Will the 2022 election mark a shift to the left?
The endless setbacks faced by the Socialists and Greens—whose core supporters have largely been drawn away by Emmanuel Macron’s momentum—reflect the persistent weakness of a lackluster far left. A political space therefore remains open for La France Insoumise, which is gradually repositioning itself further to the left.
Does this mean the party is breaking with populist strategy, instead seeking to move beyond the left-right divide in favor of new social divides? It is more simply a matter of political expediency, given the weakness of the parliamentary left and the growing appeal of new political actors. Issues such as environmentalism, feminism, anti-racism, and the fight against authoritarianism are championed wholeheartedly by Jean-Luc Mélenchon and his supporters. At the risk of also introducing into the party’s structure a set of divisions specific to these movements, which are particularly pronounced on the left.
However, the media attention these issues receive and the overrepresentation of a young, educated demographic could end up alienating La France Insoumise from segments of the working class that are receptive to social justice issues but wary of the “left-wing” label.
These “angry but not far-right” voters, who emerged on the political scene during the Yellow Vests movement, represent the visible part of a mosaic of non-voters and Le Pen supporters that the FI sought to win over. Breaking with this initial plan, without managing to reach a social-democratic electorate that still holds a terrible view of Jean-Luc Mélenchon, could jeopardize the radical left’s prospects of coming to power in future elections, especially since the Insoumis candidate failed to make it to the second round of the 2022 presidential election. For the Insoumis leader, the 2022 election represented a final campaign before stepping down.
Maintaining the party’s momentum after his departure will be a major challenge, given that both the FI and the Popular Union are initiatives heavily centered on his persona. However, the emergence of a figure capable of replacing him while maintaining the party’s programmatic coherence could enable this political camp to break through an electoral glass ceiling largely attributable to Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s divisive personality.
Arthur Groz, Research Associate, University of Montpellier
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Readthe original article.