Will La France Insoumise be able to sustain itself over the long term?
Jean-Luc Mélenchon's score, placing him in third place in the first round of the presidential election in April 2022, is the culmination of a third successful campaign by the leader of the French radical left, rather than a fundamental shift in momentum dating back to the launch of La France Insoumise.
Arthur Groz, University of Montpellier
Understanding the current state of this political structure requires an assessment of its strengths in reshaping the national political landscape, as well as the limitations encountered in the six years since its founding.
During the 2010s, the electoral successes of Syriza in Greece and then Podemos in Spain inspired a movement centered around the Left Party and Jean-Luc Mélenchon, who shared the view that attempts to form a "left-wing cartel" bringing together a coalition of parties had failed.
On Wednesday, February 10, 2016, during a television appearance, Jean-Luc Mélenchon surprised everyone by announcing his candidacy for the 2017 French presidential election. Only a few close associates had been informed of this decision, which marked the end of the Front de gauche (Left Front) and the launch of a new movement, La France Insoumise (Unbowed France).
A structure inspired by influential forces on the left
The success was immediate, facilitated by minimalist and free online membership typical of the new forms of partisanship emerging in Europe: by March 27, 2017, the campaign website had 332,123 registered members. This structure, openly inspired by Podemos, attempts to reconcile the verticality of decision-making and charismatic leadership of a traditional party with the horizontality of engagement through local support groups, characteristic of the "movement parties" analyzed by Rémi Lefebvre.
The Insoumis candidate ultimately obtained 19.58% of the vote in the first round of the 2017 presidential election, trailing closely behind the Republican candidate, a breakthrough that was partially confirmed in June with the election of 17 deputies. Such initial successes could have given La France Insoumise the role of leading opposition force that it had set out to assume.
Five years later, the initial gamble has given way to significant disillusionment, without leading to the collapse of the organization. The rebellious partisan label has lost its value and now blends into a broader identity that echoes the idea of a coalition of progressive forces under the name of the Popular Union.
This new label clearly refers to Salvador Allende's Chilean Unidad Popular, as well as to the legacy of the Common Program or, more recently, the Greek coalition Syriza, which brings together parties and associations.
But in terms of both its technical aspects (holograms of the candidate, coordinated social media campaigns) and its programmatic elements, the 2022 campaign is largely a repeat of the 2017 campaign.
The slight decline in the mobilization of members and supporters at rallies and marches (in Marseille and Paris) reflects the party's difficulty in establishing itself over the long term. This extremely mixed record can be explained by both economic factors and structural weaknesses that have been particularly evident in recent years.
The effectiveness and failures of a populist strategy
The FI strategy devised in 2017 can be described as " left-wing populist," in line with the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. For its thinkers, the aim is to break the electoral deadlock in which the radical left finds itself by proposing a clear program.
This is summarized around cross-cutting themes that are likely to mobilize support beyond the ranks of the left, targeting in particular the working classes who are inclined to abstain from voting or cast a protest vote for the far right.
The Republic and national symbols are imbued with new meaning and intertwined with those inherited from protest movements in the leader's discourse. Both symbolically and in terms of engagement, the break with traditional left-wing parties is complete: the minimal structure of the party prevents the formation of local fiefdoms, and the rebellious conventions simply sanction the general direction defined upstream. The network of Left Party executives forms the backbone of the rebellion on the ground.
"Walking on two legs" does not prevent a crisis
To maintain momentum between two election periods conducive to politicization, FI must "walk on two legs," mobilizing both within institutions and on the streets. Such sequences have marked the radical left in southern Europe: the Indignados in Spain, the occupation of public squares in Greece in 2011, and the protests against the "Labor Law" in France in 2016 have served as springboards for the launch of new partisan forces relaying their demands in parliaments.
But far from strengthening these movements, the arrival of Syriza and Podemos in power at the municipal level has tended to accompany a decline in social mobilization.
The same is true for FI, which went through a major crisis between 2017 and 2019. Some of its original leaders, such as Thomas Guénolé, Charlotte Girard, and Georges Kuzmanovic, left the party at that time, disappointed by the weakness of its internal democratic mechanisms and changes in its political line.
With 11.03% in the first round of the 2017 legislative elections, then 4.86% in the second round, 6.31% in the 2019 European elections (for 6 seats obtained), as well as disappointing results for the "citizen lists" supported in the 2020 municipal elections, the scores of La France Insoumise are in sharp decline.
The gap between emerging popular aspirations and political proposals aimed at young urban graduates is particularly striking in 2019. Despite a possible convergence in demands, the Yellow Vests movement is not benefiting the FI in any way, even though its activists are quickly getting involved.
The failure is real: during the five-year term, FI has not managed to build a popular coalition around itself that brings together those disappointed with institutional politics while giving voice to emerging movements, in line with the tribune function dear to political scientist Georges Lavau.
Grassroots activists struggle to find their place in an organization that gives them considerable autonomy but is run in an extremely top-down manner. Attempts to establish a counter-hegemonic discourse through outlets such as Le Média or by rallying figures such as MP François Ruffin are struggling to bear fruit in the cultural "war of position" inspired by Antonio Gramsci's thinking. Nevertheless, the leadership gained over the rest of the French left in the previous presidential election has been maintained.
A shift to the left in the 2022 elections?
The endless setbacks suffered by the Socialists and Greens, whose driving forces have been largely sapped by Emmanuel Macron's momentum, echo the persistent weakness of a sluggish far left. This leaves political space open for La France Insoumise, which is gradually repositioning itself on the left.
Should we conclude that the party is breaking with populist strategy, instead planning to move beyond the left-right divide in favor of new social divisions? It is more simply a matter of opportunism, given the weakness of the parliamentary left, coupled with the growing appeal of new players. Issues such as ecology, feminism, anti-racism, and the fight against authoritarianism are being fully embraced by Jean-Luc Mélenchon and his supporters. This risks importing into the party structure a set of divisions specific to these movements, which are particularly pronounced on the left.
However, the media visibility of these issues and the overrepresentation of a young, educated population could result in La France Insoumise alienating a section of the working class that is sensitive to social justice issues but wary of the left-wing label.
These "angry but not fascist" voters, who appeared on the political scene during the Yellow Vests movement, are the visible part of a mosaic of abstainers and Le Pen voters that FI sought to win over. Breaking with this initial project, without managing to reach a social-democratic electorate that still has a terrible image of Jean-Luc Mélenchon, could jeopardize the radical left's prospects of coming to power in future elections, especially since the Insoumis candidate failed to make it to the second round of the 2022 presidential election. For the Insoumis leader, the 2022 election represented a final campaign before handing over the reins.
Maintaining momentum after his departure will be a major challenge, as both FI and the Popular Union are initiatives that are heavily personalized around his persona. However, the emergence of a figure who can replace him while maintaining his programmatic consistency could enable this political camp to break through an electoral glass ceiling that is largely due to Jean-Luc Mélenchon's divisive personality.
Arthur Groz, Associate Researcher, University of Montpellier
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